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INTRODUCTION
Edgar Bishop Vandiver III was MORS
President 1992–1993 and was elected a Fel-
low of MORS and Wanner Laureate in
1995. In 1984, Mr. Vandiver became the
second Director of the U.S. Army Concepts
Analysis Agency (CAA) in Bethesda, MD
which became the Center for Army Analy-
sis (CAA) in 1998 and moved to Fort Bel-
voir, VA in 1999. This interview was con-
ducted over the course of three separate
occasions: December 13, 2004, at the MORS
Office, Alexandria, VA; December 30, 2004
at CAA, Fort Belvoir, VA; plus 28 March
2005 at CAA.
BOB SHELDON: Today is Monday the
13th of December 2004. It is 1600 and I am
at the MORS Headquarters in Alexandria,
Virginia with my colleague Mike Garram-
bone and our distinguished MORS Past
President and Fellow of the Society, Mr.
E.B. Vandiver. I’d like to start with some
basic questions about your background.
Where were you born and raised?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was born in Ken-
nett, Missouri, in the boot heel of Missouri,
which is the two southeastern counties that
stick down into Arkansas over by the Mis-
sissippi River.
BOB SHELDON: Tell us your parents’
names, and what they did for a living.
E.B. VANDIVER: My father’s name is
the same as mine. He was E.B. Vandiver, Jr.
I’m the third. He was a businessman, in the
cotton business. He owned cotton land. He
owned a cotton gin. He also had an interest
in movie theatres and he ran a hardware
store. My mother’s name was Lora Belle
Fray. Fray was her maiden name. Her fa-
ther had come to America from France as a
small boy. He ran a lumber mill.
BOB SHELDON: Did your parents in-
spire you towards mathematics or engi-
neering?
E.B. VANDIVER: My father always
tried to aimme in the direction of science or
engineering.
BOB SHELDON: Tell us about your
early schooling.
E.B. VANDIVER: I went to the Kennett
public schools up through the eighth grade.
Then I went off to northern Indiana and
spent four years at Culver Military Acad-
emy, graduating in the class of 1956.
BOB SHELDON: You did drill and
ceremony there and all the usual military
stuff?
E.B. VANDIVER: That’s a bit of an
understatement. {Laughter} Culver, in the
1950s was a junior version of the military
academy at West Point.
BOB SHELDON: Other than the mili-
tary courses, I assume you took some hard-
core math and science courses?
E.B. VANDIVER: Culver is a college
prep school. You only took four courses a
year. We graduated from high school with
exactly sixteen credits. Four in English, four
in math, and then the rest of them could get
divided up a little bit between history, lan-
guage, science and maybe something else.
BOB SHELDON: Did you go to this
military prep school by choice or did your
parents force you there?
E.B. VANDIVER: Absolutely not by
choice. {Laughter} I was incarcerated in a
monastery, in a crusading military order,
for four years. Totally against my will. I’m
very close to my classmates. We’re all very
much in touch today, and most of us de-
scribe our experience as ‘We Survived Cul-
ver.’
BOB SHELDON: Were there a lot of
prior military folks teaching there?
E.B. VANDIVER: For thirty formative
years, from about 1900 up into the 1930s,
the Superintendent of Culver was General
Leigh Gignilliat, who was an 1897 graduate
of the Virginia Military Institute. He made
Culver into a junior edition of VMI in the
1890s. So I like to tell people that I went to
VMI in the 1890s.
BOB SHELDON:Where did you go to
college?
E.B. VANDIVER: I went to the Univer-
sity of Missouri in Columbia. At that time
the University of Missouri had a reputation
of being the biggest party school in Amer-
ica. So I went from a monastery to Sodom
and Gomorrah. {Laughter}And it was won-
derful.
BOB SHELDON:What did you study?
E.B. VANDIVER: I started in engineer-
ing—originally mechanical engineering,
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and then chemical engineering. I was two years
into the engineering curriculum, but when I
was a sophomore, I took Physics—a whole year
of the University Physics, and decided I liked
that a lot better. So I changed my major to
Physics. I graduated and got a Bachelor’s De-
gree in Physics, and then I stayed there and got
a Masters Degree in Physics.
BOB SHELDON: How did you happen to
stay on for your Masters?
E.B. VANDIVER: This had more to do
with my wife and future father-in-law. When I
asked him for her hand in marriage, “No, no,
no” her daddy said. “You can marry her, but
you have to keep her in school until she grad-
uates,” and she had another year and a half of
school to go. I had no intention of getting a
Masters Degree, but I stayed on so I could get
her graduated, because I wanted to get mar-
ried. So as for the advanced degree, you can
blame Patty for it.
BOB SHELDON: You were in ROTC?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was in the ROTC pro-
gram, and it was branch ROTC and I was in the
Field Artillery.
BOB SHELDON: You took four years of
ROTC?
E.B. VANDIVER: I only took one year of
basic; because of Culver I didn’t have to take
the required two. It was a land grant university
so you had to take the first two years—every-
body had to take two years of ROTC. But I got
out of one of them because I got credit for
Culver. I took senior ROTC and learned field
artillery and went to summer camp out at Fort
Sill, Oklahoma. Then when it came time to get
commissioned, I put down what I wanted in
order of branch preference. I put down I
wanted Artillery, Infantry, or Armor as a
branch. Well, I got commissioned in the Army
Chemical Corps. The reason for that was at that
time you could not be commissioned into the
combat arms—this is 1960—if you had eyesight
as poor as mine. But a few years later in Viet-
nam, they got a whole lot less picky about that.
It’s probably just as well though. If I had been
commissioned into field artillery, I might have
gone off and done that and then stayed in the
Army.
BOB SHELDON: How was ROTC com-
pared to your high school military academy
experience?
E.B. VANDIVER: They’re really not com-
parable. At Culver we were all spit and polish,
and I was on the drill team. We had a fantastic
drill team. ROTC was pretty relaxed on those
kinds of standards, but the subject matter was
very good and solid, and you had to learn it.
BOB SHELDON: So you were commis-
sioned in 1960.
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. I was commissioned
in June. After I went on active duty in 1962, I
really liked that, and I was first in my class at
Officer’s Basic Course because I was the only
one that hadn’t had Branch Chemical ROTC so
it was all new to me. So I studied it and ended
up first in the class. I was offered a regular
commission, but Patty made me a different of-
fer. You know, you can have me or the Army,
but you can’t have both. So I stayed with the
Army in another way.
BOB SHELDON: How did you like your
active duty experience?
E.B. VANDIVER: It was fabulous. I was in
the Combat Developments Command (CDC),
in the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
(CBR) agency. I was in studies and testing. I fell
into this business with my first assignment in
the Army purely by accident. When I was in
junior high school, I had read an article in the
Saturday Evening Post about military operations
research. Actually it was about the Operations
Research Office (ORO) at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. I got the article and we re-published it
in theMOR Journal a few years ago. Well, I read
that article and said, “This is what I want to
do.” Now I had no idea how to do it or any-
thing else. So I just fell into it when I got into
the Army. I was running field experiments on
chemical defensive equipment, extending the
results of the experiment using simulation, us-
ing test data in it. This was in 1963 and 1964,
but it’s as advanced as almost anything we do
now. So I had a very good tour in the Army. I
ran an experiment and had half the post work-
ing for me at times. I had a GS-15 who was
nominally the test director and I was his Lieu-
tenant assistant. But I was just like Radar
O’Reilly. “Just sign here, Mr. Schaffer. Just sign
here, you don’t need to read this, just sign this
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memo.” {Laughter} And he’d sign anything I
brought him.
BOB SHELDON: Can you tell us some of
the variables in those tests?
E.B. VANDIVER:What we were looking at
was mask leakage under field conditions. We
had about a company-size unit of troops and
we had a simulated tactical situation; it was
either at a bivouac, or it was an attack, or it was
a defense. Each test subject had a gauze mask
taped over his nose and mouth. And with that
on, you can breathe okay. Then we had a time
where we set off an alarm and everybody had
to don a mask. At that time, we released a cloud
of harmless bacteria: Bacillus globigii (BG).
Parts of Fort McClellan are probably still con-
taminated where I ran this test. If your mask
leaked around the edge, around the periphery
of it, it would collect on this gauze. Then we
had a way of measuring the ambient concen-
tration—the concentration of the bugs that
were in the air—and then we would count the
number of bugs on each one of these masks by
culturing them and then divide it into squares
and counting and developing a distribution to
make a statistical estimate. You first count the
bugs and then we could come up with a ratio
that we would use for a leakage factor, which
roughly translates into a percent leakage factor.
It turned out that under rough field conditions,
about 10 to 15% of the soldiers had masks that
leaked. This is still a problem today—in trying
to get a perfect seal on those things. Now the
leakage was statistically distributed and that
doesn’t translate directly into casualties. But it
does translate into a fair number of casualties
and we made an estimate of that. We took the
distribution of leakages, and then we took dos-
age contours from the test data from out at
Dugway Proving Ground, from live agent fir-
ing, where they had measured the dosage con-
tours. We then overlaid that onto troops in a
tactical situation, and then assigned leakages to
them by drawing from those distributions.
From this we could compute an estimated
number of casualties. This was pretty good
stuff. The people up at Edgewood Arsenal who
make masks came totally unglued over the
thought that anybody would possibly criticize
their precious mask. This was because they
tested it in this chamber affixed to this copper
head, and they didn’t show any leakage when
they did that. But that’s a little different than a
live human who hasn’t shaved perfectly, and
whose skin is oily, and doesn’t put the thing
quite on right. So we were looking at opera-
tional leakage. This was an operational test so
there was a giant brouhaha over the thing, and
the R&D Command non-concurred with us and
questioned our morals, ethics, and parentage.
Then the next year everything turned around
and they used it as the justification for a new
mask development program. Things haven’t
changed a bit, guys. This was in the early 1960s.
BOB SHELDON: Was there any contro-
versy to using human subjects for the tests?
E.B. VANDIVER: The worst that can hap-
pen to you from a large dosage of BG is it’ll give
you diarrhea. And these were all young,
healthy males. Nobody even got sick from it as
far as I know.
BOB SHELDON: They didn’t complain?
E.B. VANDIVER: Of course not. We had a
draft Army then. These were troops. They were
from a TO&E (Table of Organization and
Equipment) field unit. So no, nobody com-
plained.
BOB SHELDON: Did you write up a re-
port?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. This is one of the
reports of the infamous Project SAMPLES—
Phase III. This is pretty neat in that we used a
lot of different techniques in one little study.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have statistics in
college before you went there?
E.B. VANDIVER: I had had mathematical
statistics. I had not really had a practical course
in statistics. I was learning that on my own. But
if you’ve got a Masters Degree in Physics, you
have a Masters Degree in math as a lesser in-
cluded offense. But I hadn’t really had any
practical statistics courses. I had to just learn
that all on my own. But I had an S&E—an
enlisted scientific and engineering person. We
drafted people that had good solid scientific
backgrounds and then there was a program
where they could get used in technical jobs. I
had a Specialist 4 who worked for me that had
a Masters Degree in statistics. So he taught me
the statistics—everything I needed to know.
And he worked on the thing.
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BOB SHELDON: A corporal taught you
statistics?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, that’s right. He had
a Masters Degree in statistics and had gotten
drafted.
BOB SHELDON: How many years did
you spend on active duty?
E.B. VANDIVER: I spent two years and
four months. I extended a little bit in order to
finish up the project. We weren’t quite done
staffing the thing, and I wanted to see it
through to the end.
BOB SHELDON: How did you decide
what you wanted to do after you left the Army?
E.B. VANDIVER: I wanted to do analysis.
I wanted to do this from the time I read that
article in the Saturday Evening Post in the early
1950s, and I was doing it. So I wanted to keep
doing it. Now we’d get reports from RAC, the
Research Analysis Corporation, and from
CORG, the Combat Operations Research
Group, which both were in Washington. CORG
supported the Combat Developments Com-
mand. RAC supported the Headquarters of the
Army. So when it came time to get out of the
Army and do something else, I applied for jobs
to those two organizations, and came up to
Washington and interviewed with the two. I
liked CORG better. They were just forming up
a big new wargaming division and I was inter-
ested in wargaming. So I came up and went to
work for CORG in August 1964.
BOB SHELDON: Was that a civil service
job?
E.B. VANDIVER: Oh, no, no. This was a
contractor agency. CORG was a contractor for
CDC. CORG had been established by ORO. The
Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins—
but they didn’t want to keep it. So they turned
the contract over to a company up in Boston
called Technical Operations, Inc. They owned
the CORG contract. It had originally been about
a 25 or a 30-man operation down at Fort Mon-
roe. Then after they formed CDC in 1962, it
moved up to Fort Belvoir and it expanded up to
about 150. They were in the expansion phase
when I happened to write a letter saying, “Hey,
I’m interested in this.” They saw my back-
ground and education, and said, “Come on
up.” I worked at Fort Belvoir just about one
block from where my new building is.
BOB SHELDON: Did you move into an
entry-level position or a mid-grade position?
E.B. VANDIVER: I don’t know how you’d
characterize it. We had a war game facility and
a new wargaming division. They’d brought Dr.
Bill Archer down from Canada who ran the
Canadian wargaming center for the Canadian
Armed Forces. The division had a blue team
made of blue players that were all retired Army
officers. In fact, we had two retired brigadier
generals and a bunch of retired colonels, lieu-
tenant colonels, and majors. These were all of
the blue players. We had a red division which
was made of retired Military Intelligence offic-
ers. These were our red team. We had control-
lers who were generals and colonels. And then
we had an assessment branch. They did all the
game design, collected the data, and did assess-
ments. All manually done of course with ac-
counting pads, mechanical calculators, and
slide rules. That was the level of automation we
had. I was in the assessments branch, but I was
one of several junior people—new hires there.
One of the older people from CORG was the
head of that group. Martin Chase was the head
of CORG at the time.
BOB SHELDON: Who were your peers at
CORG?
E.B. VANDIVER: They have all left the
business. Of the group that was at CORG, the
only other one that was there about the same
time and was not in my group was John Riente,
who retired now some years ago as the DCSOPS
(Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations) Techni-
cal Advisor. In fact, John worked for me right
before I left CORG. Hunter Woodall came back
up from running the test support down on the
air assault division at Fort Benning and was
there a while, and then he left and went to
MITRE and from there to Headquarters DA
(Department of the Army). Gene Visco came
over for a while, around 1967 from RAC, and
Joanne Langston was there for a while.
BOB SHELDON: How was CORG ar-
ranged?
E.B. VANDIVER: CORG was organized by
subject area, but wargaming was different.
Wargaming was technique organized. The
other divisions were all subject matter orga-
nized. It was like combat arms and combat
support and they did analysis in support of
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various elements of the headquarters of Com-
bat Developments Command.
BOB SHELDON: Did you do any chemical
and biological stuff?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, we did. When I got
there, they were just finishing up a huge study
called Oregon Trail which was a reassessment
of tactical nuclear warfare. They had been do-
ing a lot of tactical nuclear gaming, and the
expansion of the division was being done be-
cause of the air assault concept. A monster
study at that time was called ARAME, Army
Air Mobility Evaluation. It was a huge thing of
wargames and historical studies. Then, you had
the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) testing out
of Fort Benning, and it had all the tests and
experiments—this is a mammoth undertaking.
I worked on airmobility—originally they called
it the Air Assault Division. I worked on war-
games with that. We gamed it in Korea. We
gamed it in Southeast Asia and a number of
other places. That project ended about early
1965 and Mr. McNamara bought the results,
and the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) turned
into the 1st Calvary Division (Airmobile) and
went to Vietnam that summer. The next project
I was on was a huge one on chemical and
biological warfare called Mandrake Root. We
did wargames of chemical warfare in Europe,
Korea, and in Southeast Asia.
BOB SHELDON: The first one that Mc-
Namara bought off on, what kinds of concepts
that you wargamed did he buy?
E.B. VANDIVER: Wargames were just a
piece of this much larger evaluation. What he
bought off on was the creation of an Army Air
Assault Division. The final design of the thing
was based on all the tests and experiments. In
the final experiments, they took the 11th Air
Assault Division (Test) and it ran an exercise
that ran all the way from Georgia up into North
Carolina. I mean, they were doing these deep
air assaults 100 miles at a time. They were
screening the Corps flank and all kinds of stuff.
He bought off on the Army converting the di-
vision to the Air Assault Division, and it was
very expensive because the Air Assault Divi-
sion design had over 400 helicopters in it. But in
the end they changed it to Airmobile Division
and they didn’t give it as many helicopters—
that is why they changed the name. It was
because it wasn’t the full Air Assault design. It
was less than that. It had fewer helicopters so
they named it the Airmobile Division.
BOB SHELDON: Has anybody ever
looked in retrospect after it was operational in
Vietnam? Were there any things you were sur-
prised by that you didn’t see in the wargames?
E.B. VANDIVER: Not really. Because a
couple of years later I was over in Vietnam on
the evaluation of the Airmobile Division and
other units. There wasn’t anything really sur-
prising that came out of that. Now there were
some different things that came out of it be-
cause of the nature of the war. But we had
gotten the airmobile concept pretty right. This
was because it’d been so thoroughly tested and
studied.
BOB SHELDON: Do you know any of the
people who briefed McNamara on it?
E.B. VANDIVER: No. Other than the Gen-
erals and CDC carried the action further. You
know, we’re just lowly contractors down there
doing studies and wargames and stuff. Your
work got folded into other things. We didn’t go
forward with it, so I couldn’t tell you anything
about any of that part.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: It sounds like you
got the badge for being a real combat analyst
and taking part in a study in Vietnam?
E.B. VANDIVER: That was a different
study. At the end of 1965, we were pretty deep
into Vietnam. The buildup was going pretty
well. The First Cav had gone over in the sum-
mer and the battle of the Ia Drang Valley was in
November 1965. General Westmoreland asked
DA to send a group over to do an evaluation of
combat operations. We were getting some ex-
perience. They needed to do an evaluation to
find out what needed to be changed. DA ap-
proved that study and gave it to Combat De-
velopments Command. Combat Developments
Command gave the analytical support mission
to CORG. Six of us went over to Vietnam to be
on-the-scene analysts. A Brigadier General was
assigned to head the study—George Mabry—
who is a fascinating man. He held a medal of
honor from World War II. Sixty field-grade of-
ficers were assigned to the study team to be
data collectors. These were majors and lieuten-
ant colonels. The remainder of the study staff
came out of an organization that already be-
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longed to General Westmoreland which was
called ACTIV, the Army Concept Team in Viet-
nam. The study stood up in early January 1966
at the ACTIV compound in Saigon with the six
analysts, the 60 data collectors, and the people
there in ACTIV. The study was organized
around what CDC called the five functions of
combat: mobility; fire support; command, con-
trol and communication; intelligence, and logis-
tics. I was the principal analyst assigned to the
command, control, and communications area.
This also included organization. The major
finding of the study oddly came out of my area.
I did the analysis for it, finding that the infantry
battalions needed another line company. They
needed another rifle company added to the
battalion. The requirement arose out of the na-
ture of operations. This is the thing that was not
anticipated that I told you about in the original
Airmobile Division. Given the tactics that were
adopted in Vietnam and the way the enemy
operated, the search and destroy mission be-
came the standard operation. The way it was
conducted was that two companies would run
the search and they would search toward a
third company. So it’s a hammer and anvil kind
of thing. You’d go out somewhere to do this. It
operates off of a base where you came in by
helicopter, and also set up some of your fire
support. Well, once you had that base, every-
body had a job to do, but the base needed to be
secured because it didn’t take the enemy very
long to discover that this was a weak point in
this tactic. So if we had three companies out
conducting the operation, there was nobody
guarding the base, and they would attack the
base.
You really needed another line company. I
developed the inkling of this very early on
because we found right off that the battalions
were creating their own fourth line companies
out of some of their heavy weapons sections
that they weren’t using. They used their anti-
tank weapons and part of their support people
and were creating these makeshift fourth rifle
companies. The Marine Corps already had a
fourth rifle company in their battalions. They
were reporting back, they weren’t having any
problems of this kind, but we were. So between
the experience, what people were doing, and
the operational logic of the thing, you could
build up the argument that you really needed a
fourth line company in the maneuver battal-
ions.
BOB SHELDON: Did you do an apples-to-
apples comparison of with and without that
fourth company?
E.B. VANDIVER: We could kind of do it
from some of the ones that had them and what
they said, and ones that didn’t and what they
said. A lot of this was pretty subjective. There
wasn’t a lot of quantitative data in big parts of
this. There was a lot of judgmental input from
commanders. We had every battalion com-
mander in the field giving us input on the
thing. We had a lot of the company command-
ers giving us input. So this was based on oper-
ational experience and reality, and that is what
went into the final briefing. General Westmore-
land approved it. The request went to DA. DA
approved it and started forming up the addi-
tional companies, and they were deploying
over there within months: the most tangible
result of a study I ever did in my life. So I
claimed to have put the fourth rifle company in
all of the units in Vietnam. So anybody hearing
this that was in Vietnam and was in a battalion
with four rifle companies in it, well, now you
know why.
BOB SHELDON: Those 60 data collectors,
what kinds of data did they collect?
E.B. VANDIVER: We gave them question-
naires. We would put questions on it and some
of them were open-ended. You know, just sit
down with a guy and get a narrative answer on
the thing. Others we would have would be a
kind of multiple choice where we would ask for
a range of values on something. We would
send one instrument out and they would collect
that and send it back in and then we’d see what
we’d done wrong on the thing and we’d correct
it and send a new one out because we did not
have time to really test these things before we
put them into the field, and you always do
something wrong. It was a mixture of quanti-
tative and qualitative, but very heavy on expe-
rience. We were relying very heavily on expe-
rience, so it met with great acceptance as it
went up the line.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Where did you
live when you were doing all of this?
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E.B. VANDIVER: Two other analysts and I
lived in an apartment down near the central
market, which is right on the edge between
Saigon and Cholon, Cholon being the Chinese
part of Saigon. The Navy actually ran the ad-
ministrative services in Saigon at the time. They
had school buses that ran routes around and we
had one pickup point about a block from our
apartment that ran down that main drag and
went down to Cholon. We could ride that bus
all the way downtown and change, and take
another bus and go over to ACTIV. Or we
could walk it since it was about a 30-minute
walk. Sometimes we’d do one, and sometimes
the other.
BOB SHELDON: And the 60 data collec-
tors went out to the field?
E.B. VANDIVER: They were in the field.
They were out living with their units. There
were some for infantry divisions, some for the
maneuver battalions, and some for the bri-
gades. They were associated with all the head-
quarters.
BOB SHELDON: Was their fulltime job
data collection, or did they carry a rifle too?
E.B. VANDIVER: No, they were there to
collect data, and they were mostly TDY from
CONUS. When the study was over, they went
back home. In the field they were armed. Ev-
eryone was. Even as civilian analysts we rarely
went to the field unarmed.
BOB SHELDON: Your group came up
with the most successful finding. What about
the others?
E.B. VANDIVER: A lot of it had to do with
the airmobile operations and the nature of
them. There were a lot of little kinds of fixes
that were needed in material and what we call
TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) now.
There was this raging argument about whether
they ought to have 60 or 81 millimeter mortars.
The same argument is going on today. {Laugh-
ter} There is no better answer today than there
was back then, and so the answer was, “Well,
we’ll just use both.” The problem was, you
needed the big mortar because of the firepower
and the lethality of it, but if you’re out humping
across the jungle, you can’t carry more than half
a dozen rounds. With the 60 millimeter mortar
you can carry a lot of rounds. So they ended up
having both. You carried one when you could
and brought the other one in later. The larger
one could be put in a firebase and even ones of
bigger sizes.
BOB SHELDON: How long were you over
there doing this study?
E.B. VANDIVER: We were there four
months; January, February, March, and April.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: It seems like you
did this study ‘from soup to nuts.’
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, we did. It was very
comprehensive. It was called ARCOV, Army
Combat Operations in Vietnam. A year later
they did another one called MACOV. Mecha-
nized and Armor Combat Operations in Viet-
nam. Gene Visco was on that one, but I wasn’t.
BOB SHELDON: The other civilians that
went with you, do you know them by name?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. Wes Curtis was the
head of our group and he was a pretty senior
analyst that originally started up at AMSAA
(Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency) at
Aberdeen Proving Ground. He had come down
to CORG when they expanded there in the
early ’60s. He was pretty senior then and was
the head of the group. The rest were pretty
much junior analysts. One of themwas a retired
Major, Pohlman was his name. Then there was
the three of us who were all about the same age
and background. There was me, Bill Carswell,
and Bill Brown. We all belonged to the same
fraternity by happenstance at three different
schools. It was Pi Kappa Alpha, a social frater-
nity. None of them are in the business anymore
today, except for me.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What do you
think about combat data?
E.B. VANDIVER: Combat data, first of all,
is extremely messy. You are not going to get
anybody—and I’m speaking now from both
experiences in Vietnam, and what we’re expe-
riencing over in Iraq and Afghanistan now—
you’re not going to get commanders to collect
anything unless you get some very senior com-
mander to tell them to collect it. And com-
manders are not going to tell them to collect it
unless they think it’s really important. Now,
General Westmoreland asked for this study to
be done so everybody cooperated. I mean, this
is the Army, and the data collectors were all
field-grade officers so they had credibility with
the people they were out talking to. We tried to
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make the instruments such that we weren’t ask-
ing anybody technical questions. We were ask-
ing about operations. Operational kinds of stuff
that is, and the kind that we could then analyze.
Data we could do some simple statistics on or
make graphical displays, and then analyze it
from there. Now, we can do a lot more sophis-
ticated things today, and indeed we are.
BOB SHELDON: Did it seem pretty calm
to get back to stateside operations after being in
a combat zone?
E.B. VANDIVER: It sure did. But I very
quickly got into another Vietnam related study.
That was on the requirements for ammunition,
particularly because the use of large caliber
artillery ammunition was going up at a tremen-
dous rate. DA was balking at this and wanted
them to project out into the future what ought
to be their expenditure rate. Dr. Wilbur B.
Payne’s office in Army headquarters asked
CORG to take a look to see if they could come
up with some way of forecasting artillery am-
munition expenditures. I ended up getting that
job and put together a forecasting methodology
based on the kinds of operations that were be-
ing conducted and the typical expenditures
used on different missions during operations. I
then compounded that to make a forecast based
on what they forecast about the operational
variables. I templated the artillery ammunition
usage to a kind of operation, and then asked
them about their operations—I didn’t ask them
to forecast the ammunition. I asked them to
forecast the tempo of operations and the occur-
rence of different kinds of operations. I had to
go back to Vietnam to collect data on that and I
went back for three weeks in early 1967. I then
made the forecast on the thing and ended up
briefing this all the way to the Secretary of the
Army, who was Mr. Stanley Resor.
BOB SHELDON: What were the variables
you collected data on?
E.B. VANDIVER: The first thing I looked
at was what the ammunition was being used
for. What are we shooting? One thing we were
shooting was to prepare landing zones for air-
mobile operations. The frequency of air mobile
operations was a big one, because we really
prep these landing zones. And we used these
zones on search and destroy missions when we
engaged a unit. We would try to pin them
down and then pound the hell out of them. It
was the rate at which we actually made contact
and then engaged units—these were two tem-
plated expenditures. Battalions, just by virtue
of being in the field, expended a certain amount
of artillery just as background to operations. A
lot of ammunition was just fired as H&I, Ha-
rassing and Interdiction fires. No target per se,
they just think well, we’ll fire out here and
there and other places because somebody
might be there. It is essentially firing at some-
thing and hoping that something or some en-
emy may by happenstance be there. I found
that actually the bulk of the expenditures were
just being fired off into nothing so to speak. I
would ask the headquarters to forecast at what
rate units would be going to the field and op-
erating. From that estimate I could make an
estimate on these close engagements. Then I
could also make an estimate on the number of
air mobile operations and getting that, com-
pound these things to get an amount.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Since you studied
as a field artillery officer, you knew a lot about
field artillery and ammunition?
E.B. VANDIVER: Oh yes, I knew a little
something about our field artillery operations.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: I think one of the
interesting thoughts here is certainly your ex-
perience and background—it’s like the tactical
guy going to the technical problem. How do
you feel about this?
E.B. VANDIVER: I thought it was a pretty
straightforward kind of problem to deal with.
BOB SHELDON: How many other people
worked on that study with you?
E.B. VANDIVER:Me. I did it all by myself.
BOB SHELDON: And it went up to the
Secretary of the Army?
E.B. VANDIVER: It went all the way to the
Secretary of the Army. Dr. Payne and Abe
Golub were behind it. I actually worked it for
Abe and he was the one that wanted to take it
up as his project.
BOB SHELDON: How long did the study
take?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was doing that for
about four months.
BOB SHELDON: Did you formulate a re-
gression equation or a Lanchester attrition
equation?
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E.B. VANDIVER: No, I didn’t do any of
that. It was much more simple and determinis-
tic than that. I later did a regression, and it
showed about the same thing.
BOB SHELDON: What was your next
project?
E.B. VANDIVER: After that one, I became
a Branch Chief and something of a manager,
and I had three or four projects.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You were still
working for CORG at the time?
E.B. VANDIVER: Right. But I moved to a
new division. Actually, it was the same one, but
after I finished the project, I became a Branch
Chief and then I had three or four projects
under me.
BOB SHELDON: What branch was that?
E.B. VANDIVER: I don’t remember its
name at the moment, but Don Hall was the
Division Chief. He was a wonderful man. He
was an older man and a fairly senior analyst.
He’d been at AMSAA years earlier. I had joined
him as an analyst when I came back from Viet-
nam, and then when I finished that project, he
made me one of the Branch Chiefs. John Riente
worked for me then. He had the artillery am-
munition rates. Interesting what became of the
ammunition rate studies. I am still doing them
today at CAA. John did the first ones back in
1966 and 1967 and it was artillery estimation
using simulation. But now it is on future sce-
narios. This isn’t current operations. Then, I
had operational data and I had experience data.
I had all kinds of good stuff to work with. But
this was now future stuff. This was combat
developments. Added to that, I had another
group that was building a simulation of attack
helicopter operations. I also had a cost effective-
ness analysis on attack helicopters and a couple
of other projects.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: I’ve noticed you
haven’t mentioned the word computer once.
E.B. VANDIVER: We didn’t have any.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So when you say
simulation, do you mean with machines?
E.B. VANDIVER: Now that was being
done. Two simulations were being coded for
computers. John Riente used the STAG (Strat-
egy and Tactics Analysis Group) computers
over in the organization that became CAA.
They had an IBM 7090. I’ve got a picture of it
down there in the library at CAA. John would
drive over to Bethesda and turn in his job and
his deck of cards and they’d run it overnight
and then he’d go back the next morning and
pick up the printouts on the thing. This was
allowed because they had excess capacity over
there. Whenever we needed computer runs, we
got them from STAG. We did the same thing on
the helicopter simulation. We would take the
deck over there and run it on the trial run and
then bring it back. I don’t think that thing ever
did get developed. That was a typical simula-
tion development project, like some of the ones
you are probably familiar with. It had been
going on a long time when I got it, and I think
it was still going when I left and it may still be
going on somewhere. This was going on
around 1966 and 1967.
BOB SHELDON: You were in Vietnam
twice for short intervals. Had you noticed a
change in the political climate there between
your two visits?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, I think by 1967 the
Americans had totally overrun the place and
were doing everything. They were everywhere
and were doing everything. The war belonged
to us by then and things were a whole lot less
clear then just a year earlier.
BOB SHELDON: After this munitions
study, then you were put in charge. Were any
studies of consequence done under your super-
vision?
E.B. VANDIVER: No. Not really. We
didn’t have very good projects then. I should
mention, though, that we did the study over in
Vietnam from January through April and then
we came back in May. In the fall of 1966, we
went to the MORS Symposium and gave a gen-
eral session presentation on what we had done
over there.
BOB SHELDON: Was that your first
MORS Symposium?
E.B. VANDIVER: That was my first and it
was the 18th MORSS at the Kennedy School of
Special Warfare at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Bill Carswell, Bill Brown, and I each had a
20-minute general session presentation. I cov-
ered just my area, and a piece of somebody
else’s. We were all documented because we had
to deliver a camera-ready copy. Remember
that? It was prepared for the proceedings. That
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was for the 18th MORSS and then they were
going at the rate of two a year, so it had only
been in existence nine years at that time.
BOB SHELDON: Remember your percep-
tions of your first MORS Symposium?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was in awe of the thing.
Here we are—remember, this is 1966. I’m only
28 years old and here are all of the giants of the
field, and I’m briefing a general session of the
MORSS.
BOB SHELDON: That means you had a
large audience?
E.B. VANDIVER: I had a whole audito-
rium full. We were using lantern slides. You
remember what those are?
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You’re going to
have to tell us what lantern slides are.
E.B. VANDIVER: If you’re projecting to a
big audience, you’ve got to have something
that uses a very strong illumination source. So
one of the devices that was commonly used for
auditoriums was the lantern projector, and the
lantern slide was on a piece of glass about three
inches by four inches. You put a slide in one at
a time and you had this humongous bulb in the
thing that would project it up big enough and
bright enough, where you could read it in an
auditorium. Now, there’s a piece of antique
technology. So, if you’ve got a briefing, you will
have a box full of these glass slides that
weighed about ten pounds.
BOB SHELDON: Did you get any techni-
cal questions from the audience?
E.B. VANDIVER: They were the usual, I
thought. OR analysts asked questions about did
you really ask the right questions and how do
you know you needed more companies rather
than more battalions? These were fairly easy to
answer. But no, I didn’t think I got very good
questions. I was a little disappointed at that.
BOB SHELDON: Did you sit in any other
working group sessions?
E.B. VANDIVER: I did go to some sessions
on wargaming. I was very interested in war-
gaming still, and I went to see some. RAC was
presenting some things they had been doing on
wargaming. They were wargaming in Iran
against the Soviet threat, where we’re defend-
ing our loyal Iranian allies.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: This idea of war-
gaming has come up several times thus far. It
seems like you have a firm interest in that topic.
Do you still do that?
E.B. VANDIVER: We do, but we don’t do
it anywhere near the same way. We do it now
with the campaign simulations, but the way we
do them now, they’re quasi wargames. This is
because we do it by phase and we interrupt and
change things from phase to phase. The way
CAA does campaign analysis today, I’d say
they are very elaborate computer-assisted war-
games.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How would you
classify the games back then?
E.B. VANDIVER: They were manual war
games. A lot of them were two-sided and
closed, so they were very slow. Red and blue
only had their intelligence situation. Only con-
trol had ground truth. Nobody does much of
that anymore. But the closed game was consid-
ered to be the preferred mode of wargaming
then. It was very expensive and it was very
slow. It took a lot of players and a lot of time.
That’s pretty much why it’s gone out of style
today.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: But you liked the
results?
E.B. VANDIVER: Oh, yes. We liked the
results because the commanders had to act on
the situation that was presented to them. They
didn’t get ground truth.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: It sounds like you
might have more dialogue about how are you
thinking about doing the operation?
E.B. VANDIVER: Right. We found out
“why you did what you did.” You don’t know
everything, so you’re explicitly dealing with
uncertainty in this mode.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: But you were able
to bring that out with the techniques you used?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. And that was part
of the findings, too. We would identify what
are the major areas of uncertainty and what the
Intelligence people need to collect on in order
to help us with this, that, or the other.
BOB SHELDON: Did your boss tell you to
go to MORS?
E.B. VANDIVER: No. Bill Brown and Car-
swell knew about MORS. I didn’t. So they set
the whole thing up, and then we talked the
management into letting us all go. I didn’t
know what it was, but they did since they had
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had exposure to it before. Bill Brown had been
an analyst in combat developments with the
Transportation School at Fort Eustis, and Bill
Carswell had been an enlisted scientific and
engineering person up with HUMRRO, the Hu-
man Resources Research Organization. These
two knew about MORS and I found out
through them.
BOB SHELDON: When you were first a
supervisor of your own branch, did you send
your people to MORS?
E.B. VANDIVER: No, because I wasn’t
there very long. I tried to get to go to MORS in
1967 to brief my artillery forecasting study, but
the working group chairman I sent the request
into turned me down, which I’ve been peeved
about for forty years now. That was a really
good piece of work. I left CORG shortly there-
after in early 1967.
BOB SHELDON: Why did you leave
CORG?
E.B. VANDIVER: The three of us that had
been in Vietnam together—Bill Brown and Bill
Carswell were ready to move on. Bill Brown
had left and went down to Texas to work for
LTV. Bill Carswell and I decided we’d just get
out and start our own company, and do it all
ourselves. So that is what we did. Incredibly
brash thing to do, but when you’re young, you
can do stuff like that.
BOB SHELDON: What was the name of
your company?
E.B. VANDIVER: It was Carswell Van-
diver & Associates. CVA, Inc. Between 1967
and 1970, our corporate growth curve followed
a perfect ballistic trajectory. It started at zero
and it went to an apogee of about $300,000 in
1968, which is about a million and a half in
today’s money. By 1970 it went back down to
zero because the bottom fell out of this whole
business in 1969 and 1970. We had some pretty
good projects with Combat Developments
Command. We did some cost effectiveness
analysis on the TACFIRE field artillery system.
TACFIRE was the first field artillery ADP sys-
tem. It did technical and tactical fire control
computations and could develop division and
corps level fire plans and keep track of muni-
tions inventories. Since it took about 20 years to
develop and field, it was obsolete when fielded
and soon replaced, a fate that befell others of
the first generation of tactical ADP systems. We
did some cost effectiveness analysis on TOS,
Tactical Operations System. We did some work
for Headquarters DA on measures of effective-
ness for Vietnam and some other things. We
really did well there for a while, and then the
bottom fell out, and then we had to go get real
jobs. So in the summer of 1970, I came up to DA
and went to work for Abe Golub who had just
taken over as the Scientific Advisor to the ACS-
FOR, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force De-
velopment.
BOB SHELDON: It is 27 December 2004
and we are here at the Center for Army Anal-
ysis, Wilbur Payne Hall at Fort Belvoir, Virginia
to continue our second session of our oral his-
tory interview with Mr. E.B. Vandiver. You said
you had recalled some stories from the 1970s.
E.B. VANDIVER: Older than that, I want
to go back to my period in college. When I was
in graduate school, I worked part-time for the
Agricultural Research Service. I was doing mul-
tiple regression on milk production data, test
data, by hand on mechanical calculators, which
is extremely tedious. They had just put in the
first mainframe computer at the University of
Missouri and it was a Burroughs 202. The thing
had vacuum tubes in it. I talked to the man I
worked for there and asked if we had an ac-
count on the university computer. I asked if I
could get this stuff programmed so I could do it
that way. He said, “Sure, go right ahead.” So I
went over there and got a book of the instruc-
tion set. This is a second generation computer,
possibly a first generation—I’m not sure how
you differentiate them. But it had no operating
system. You wrote code directly to the ALU
(Arithmetic Logic Unit).
BOB SHELDON: In assembly language?
E.B. VANDIVER: No, in binary code. You
were using the actual instruction set. So you
were writing binary instructions directly into
the arithmetic logic unit. You were program-
ming the processor itself. So you wrote the code
in binary and you had a book with the instruc-
tions set in it, and then you had a map of the
drum, because this thing had a rotating mag-
netic drum for memory that had 4,000 locations
in the main memory, each of which held a fairly
long number. You had this map of the drum
with all the addresses on it and so as you wrote
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the code, you tried to keep the code together as
close as possible on the drum so you didn’t
waste a lot time spinning this thing. Once you
entered the program, the people there ran the
thing. It had vacuum tubes in it; they were
always blowing when it was operating, so they
were always going down to put new tubes in it.
It was in the basement of the business school,
and there was ten tons of air conditioning on
the thing. They put the code into the thing
using paper tape. Later on, the data went in on
punch cards. So I learned very clearly exactly
how a computer operates and I decided this is
not very user friendly. I didn’t want to mess
with these things, although I wrote a program
to do multiple regression and boy, we were
doing regression like crazy then. But every few
years after that—this was 1960 and 1961—I
would check to see, “Are they user friendly
enough?” The answer was always, “No” until
just a few years ago. Then I decided, yes,
they’re not too bad now.
BOB SHELDON: Did you use statistical
designs?
E.B. VANDIVER:No, this was just straight
multiple linear regression. They had ware-
houses of data from experiments they had run
over at the agricultural research station in Kan-
sas. There they put milk cows into chambers
where they controlled humidity, temperature,
and their feed. Then they varied the kind of
cow, they varied the temperature, they varied
the humidity, and then they measured the milk
production. They’ve been doing this for years
and had mountains of this data. Well, I just
about cleared out the backlog because I got this
thing automated so we could look at what
looked to be important. The answer turns out to
be that cows give the most milk when they are
happy, just like humans are, with about 70°
temperature and 50% humidity, and whatever
their normal diet was. {Laughter} But the gov-
ernment spent a lot of money on this.
BOB SHELDON:Was that graduate school
or undergraduate school?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was in graduate school
at the time. I was working part-time. In fact, the
agricultural research station was co-located
with the University of Missouri, their agricul-
tural school. You had asked me about knowing
statistics when I was down with the Army and
then reducing the data from the big field exper-
iment. I didn’t have any problem there because
I had a Specialist 4 who had a Masters Degree
in statistics. When I got up to go to work at
CORG, Combat Operations Research Group in
wargaming, I decided I didn’t know enough
probability and statistics so I went over to
American University and took nine hours
worth of probability theory, mathematical sta-
tistics, and stochastic processes. So this is what
got me kind of up-to-speed on it. In fact, I’ve
always gone to school a little bit here and there
all the time. I must be over 300 semester hours
by now. Those were the things I wanted to
make up.
BOB SHELDON:We finished the previous
interview with your second tour in Vietnam.
You were coming back and I think you had a
job change about that time?
E.B. VANDIVER: That is right. About at
the end of the 1960s after President Nixon came
in, the bottom fell out of the contracting market.
This was because he made severe cuts in the
defense budget, shifting money over to support
Vietnamization. Contract money almost dried
up overnight. I had my own little company
then with Bill Carswell, and we were now on
the descending end of the ballistic trajectory of
our corporate growth curve. We hit zero about
the early part of 1970, and Abe Golub was
forming up the scientific advisor’s office and
ACSFOR had just started, and he asked me to
come work for him, so I did. I started on the
Army Staff on July 14th, Bastille Day, 1970, and
I was in the Army headquarters for fourteen
years after that.
BOB SHELDON: You came in as a fifteen?
How did you get such a plum position?
E.B. VANDIVER: I started as a GS-15,
which was kind of nice because Mr. Golub
knew me from the work I’d done on the Viet-
nam stuff, and particularly for the artillery am-
munition projection work, which got him a lot
of favorable publicity with the Secretary of the
Army. He had two GS-15 positions for his new
office, and he gave me one of them. Abe was
the Scientific Advisor to the Assistant Chief of
Staff of Force Development (ACSFOR) in the
Pentagon. It was a three-star major staff agency.
It has just been recreated. That is what the G8 is
today. It is a re-creation of ACSFOR. The first
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ACSFOR was LTG Ace Collins who went to
Europe then to be the four-star commander.
The second one, who was there when I came,
was LTG Bob Williams, who was an aviator
and one of the pioneers in Army aviation.
He was followed by LTG Hook Almquist.
ACSFOR went out of business in the DA reor-
ganization in 1974.
BOB SHELDON: What were your initial
projects?
E.B. VANDIVER: One of the big ones right
at the beginning had to do with fielding the
TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-
guided missile) and Dragon missile systems—
the anti-tank guided missile systems. In 1970 an
infantry battalion had either six or eight 106
millimeter recoilless rifles as their anti-tank
weaponry. It was apparent that, with attention
going back into the threat in Europe, and the
Soviet armor threat, that the recoilless rifle was
really quite inadequate. The TOW and Dragon
missile systems had been started years earlier
to deal with armor. They were just coming up
to production and the question was, “How
many of these do we put into an infantry bat-
talion?” Naturally the original position was the
TOW would be a one-for-one replacement for
the 106 recoilless rifle. But then a lot of people
said, “Wait a minute.” Now we’ve got some-
thing that’s really capable here. Let’s put
enough of them in to really do something. We
had a lot of work going on with the infantry
school, and they were running a tank, anti-tank
simulation looking at different numbers of
them to put into the infantry battalion. Later
through the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff’s Of-
fice we were running Seth Bonder’s model on
the same thing, with the early Bonder IUA (In-
dividual Unit Action) model, and looking at
different numbers. By the time we were done,
instead of the six to replace one-for-one the 106
recoilless rifles, we ended up with 18 tows and
27 Dragons in the mechanized infantry battal-
ion.
BOB SHELDON:Were the calculations for
that threat-based?
E.B. VANDIVER: Oh, yes, and based on
achieving a certain level of kill against an at-
tacking Soviet armored force.
BOB SHELDON: Was this a Fulda Gap
scenario?
E.B. VANDIVER: Right. It was the sce-
nario of choice. I mean, it was at Fulda Gap.
That’s where we were and that’s where the
threat was.
BOB SHELDON: Did the Army purchase
that many systems?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, they did. I mean it
was accepted as the TO&E (Table of Organiza-
tion and Equipment) design. How many Mech
battalions they actually equipped at that rate,
I’m not really certain. Because later there was
another big change made where instead of the
ones that just sat up on top of the M113 Ar-
mored Personnel Carriers, they put them in the
vehicle that the artillery forward observers
used, which had the armored hammerhead on
it. So I don’t know in the end how many they
had actually fielded, but they certainly set off to
do it that way. Another big project I worked on
in 1971 was the M60 A2 tank which was a
program that had run into all kinds of terrible
problems with the new turret shape and the
firing of the Shillelagh Missile. It was going to
be the interim missile firing tank until the
MBT70 (Main Battle Tank 70) came along. Well
the MBT70 never came along. The interim mis-
sile firing tank had so many problems, that they
never really completed the production on it.
They had all these hulls and turrets in storage.
Then they decided there’s not going to be an
MBT70, we probably ought to field these
things. So there was a big cost effectiveness
study we had done with AMSAA, the Army
Materials Systems Analysis Activity that
looked at fielding these. But they had so many
problems that we really couldn’t recommend
that you ought to do this. Because there were
only going to be like three or four hundred of
them total, and they were a low density item,
it’d be hard to maintain them, and the Shille-
lagh Missile system was very expensive and a
very difficult thing to make work. So we had a
whole lot of reasons that we felt we should not
field the things. Well, they fielded it anyway.
There were only about eight battalions of them
and I stayed at DA (Department of the Army)
long enough to attend the meeting where they
recommended that we wash them out of the
inventory for all of those exact same reasons.
{Laughter}
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BOB SHELDON: What was the reason
they didn’t listen to you the first time around?
Was it political?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. The Material Com-
mand was behind the thing. It’d be too embar-
rassing for them. It’s too embarrassing to kill a
program.
BOB SHELDON: So that was your first
year. Two major projects like that?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. I had a good time.
Plus we had the big field artillery studies going
on. In 1972 in fielding the non-nuclear Lance,
the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) had a
study out that says this is not a good idea. The
OSD PA&E was using that to try to prevent it,
and we had about a year of analytical trench
warfare there, but the Army position finally
carried on that issue. The system was also ap-
parently of limited capability, but it got us
started thinking about deep attack and integrat-
ing that in with maneuver and prioritizing tar-
gets, and deep targets, and a lot of kinds of
things that are pretty common today—but
were fairly revolutionary then. I didn’t actually
do the studies myself. What we did from the
headquarters is we’d go get somebody to do it,
tell them what we wanted to do, watch the
thing, and then when it’s done, put it in a form
where we can take it around and explain it to
the people who actually made decisions.
BOB SHELDON:Who did your studies for
you?
E.B. VANDIVER: It was either in Combat
Developments Command, their analysts, or
CORG, Combat Operations Research Group,
was still there, their analysis group. The Infan-
try School also did studies. Some of the schools
had pretty good analysis capabilities, so the
infantry school the field artillery school, and air
defense school did studies. Then there were
analysts out at Fort Leavenworth and at
AMSAA, and also defense contractors. There
was also the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army and they too had contrac-
tors. There were a lot of people around to study
things.
BOB SHELDON: A big problem analysts
have is receiving communication down as to
what’s really wanted and then communicating
it back up. Since you’re in the middle, how did
you address those challenges?
E.B. VANDIVER: That was a big job that
Mr. Golub and Dr. Payne had up in Headquar-
ters DA convincing people that they needed
these studies done in the first place, and ex-
plaining the results. They had had so much
grief from OSD Systems Analysis in the 1960s
over McNamara’s whiz kids, refusing to accept
Army programs unless they had some analyti-
cal basis, that they were willing to listen. In fact,
that’s why Wilbur Payne’s office (the DUSA
(OR) office) was created, and he was brought
down from OSD Systems Analysis. He was one
of the whiz kids. When he became the head of
the analysis in the Army he brought Abe Golub
in from AMSAA, and the Army then set up the
Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, and
John Honig was in there and then later Hunter
Woodall. This was something we needed if we
were going to get our programs through OSD.
Although there were a few who had different
attitudes to this, by and large that was the
general attitude.
BOB SHELDON: How many years were
you in that position?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was in ACSFOR for
four years. The most interesting year of that
was 1972. That was the year of the STEADFAST
Reorganization. It consumed a year of my life,
pretty much. Coming out of Vietnam, the Army
leadership decided that we really needed to
organize differently, particularly in CONUS
(Continental United States). The major com-
mands were very unbalanced and there were
some things that weren’t being done that
needed to be done. So the STEADFAST Reor-
ganization started off with a couple of planning
decisions that shaped it. There were then two
major CONUS commands. One was CONARC,
Continental Army Command, which owned all
of the units and all of the training. It was hu-
mongous. Then you had Combat Develop-
ments Command, which was a mouse com-
pared to the CONARC elephant. So one of the
main things that the STEADFAST Reorganiza-
tion did was re-sort Combat Developments
Command and CONARC into TRADOC (Train-
ing and Doctrine Command) and FORSCOM
(Forces Command), which are the organiza-
tions that have endured to this day. If you get a
good sound basis for an organization, it’ll usu-
ally last. Idiots will get in and change them
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sometimes, ruin them sometimes. But this one
was so good, it made so much sense, and you
ended up with two four-star Generals who had
roughly comparable commands, so now you’ve
got two huge and powerful vested interests in
keeping it this way. So it’s got a lot of stability
and it’s been a good organization. The voids
were operational testing and analysis at the
headquarters level. The other part of the go-
ing-in position on STEADFAST was to create
two new DA agencies—one for operational
tests and evaluations, and the other one for
force analysis at the headquarters DA level.
ACSFOR and Abe Golub got the action for
doing the planning for the creation of this force
analysis office because the Army force structure
responsibility was in ACSFOR. They had a di-
rector up there that was responsible for that.
The ACSFOR was responsible for specifying
the force structure. Abe Golub got the action, so
he gave it to me. I wrote the concept plan for
this thing and briefed it to the project office.
LTG Kalergis was brought in with a big project
office with a lot of water-walking majors, lieu-
tenant colonels, and colonels. So I get to do the
concept plan, brief it, and then it’s all approved.
I did the detailed plan and the staffing for it,
and all that was briefed to everybody, and that
was approved. Then the decision is made to go
ahead with the thing. The working name for it
had been the Army Force Analysis Agency. Just
as it got to the end, and they brought in the
commander and designated the implementa-
tion planning group, General DePuy changed
the name to the Concepts Analysis Agency. So
I did all the planning for the creation of CAA.
Now you won’t be the first person to say this is
poetic justice {Laughter} after all these years. So
that is how CAA was created. The new agency
for operational testing OTEA, became OPTEC
which became test command, or whatever they
are called today.
BOB SHELDON: This was happening dur-
ing the force drawdown?
E.B. VANDIVER: This was happening
during the big drawdown. I mean, the core
structure of the Army was in free fall. I think
we went down to twelve or thirteen divisions,
and then came back up after that. In fact, by the
time the Cold War ended, we were at eighteen
active divisions. I think the low point was thir-
teen in 1973.
BOB SHELDON: How did the Army staff
react to creating an agency when you’re in a
drawdown mode?
E.B. VANDIVER: We still had a draft
Army. We still had lots of people. In fact, we
didn’t get tight on people until way up into the
1980s. However, during the Cold War, the Ar-
my’s strength was quite large. The active
strength of the Army was for many years
around 780,000 to 790,000 and the Army civil-
ians were 350,000 to 400,000. We had quite a bit
of manpower. That didn’t get tight until later.
That was about all the interesting things that
happened in ACSFOR. One interesting thing,
though, is that when General Abrams came in
to be the Chief of Staff in the Army, after Gen-
eral Westmoreland’s tour was up, it was 1972
or 1973. He found out everybody was working
on Saturday morning. So he sent word out
that—let’s stop this working on Saturday
mornings. Then the first Saturday after that, he
sent the Secretary of the General Staff around to
see who was working and found out everybody
was there working. So then he sends out a
message that recounts this and says, “Next Sat-
urday I’m coming around and there’d better
not be anybody here.” {Laughter} That put an
end to Saturday work.
BOB SHELDON: Was that at the head-
quarters?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, it was Headquarters
Department of the Army (DA). Then he said
another thing. He instituted the practice of a
person who has the action carries it all the way
to the top. Before that, some poor major would
have the action, he’d do it all, he’d create a
briefing, he’d give it to his branch chief who
would then give it to his division chief. Then
when he went forward with this thing, they
drug this whole chain of command with them
up to where they were going. And usually, a
full colonel would then brief the thing, and the
AO (action officer) may or may not even be in
the room. So General Abrams said, “No, no, the
AO carries the briefing from the bottom to the
top and you don’t bring the whole chain of
command along with you.” General Abrams
did some wonderful things, but he was only
there about a year and then he died. But he
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made some vast improvements in headquarters
DA in the short time he was there.
BOB SHELDON: Did he have an analysis
background?
E.B. VANDIVER: No, he was just very
smart. Very shrewd.
BOB SHELDON: You were there until
1974?
E.B. VANDIVER: In 1974 there was an
opening for a super-grade in the DUSA(OR)’s
office—Wilbur Payne’s office. The reason was
that Pete McDevitt had gone up to a job in OSD
somewhere so this made an opening. I went to
Mr. Golub and to Dr. Payne and told them I’d
like to have that job, and Abe recommended it,
andWilbur accepted it, so I went up toWilbur’s
office as a GS-16. We still had super grades
then. This is in July 1974 and I was the youngest
super-grade in the Army. Now I’m pretty close
to being the oldest one {Laughter} but not quite.
There are a couple others that you know. Walt
Hollis has got six years on me as a super-grade.
Dr. Bill McCorkle down at Huntsville has got
several years on me as a super-grade. Probably
five.
BOB SHELDON: DUSA(OR). What kind
of work did you do?
E.B. VANDIVER: I had all of the ammuni-
tion and field artillery programs, and missile
programs that were not air defense. Plus I had
some of the DCSOPS force studies.
BOB SHELDON: How big was DUSA
(OR)?
E.B. VANDIVER: There was Wilbur
Payne, with Hunter Woodall as his deputy.
There were three SES’s under them, me, Dick
Lester, and Dan Willard. It’s about the same as
it is now. Then we had a few military, and that
was about it. We also had two or three secre-
taries. That’s back when we actually had secre-
taries and people answered telephones. It
wasn’t too much. Actually Walt’s office is a
little bit larger because it has picked up some
other things over the years.
BOB SHELDON: DUSA(OR) then was re-
porting at the same level as they are now?
E.B. VANDIVER:Actually it was reporting
to the Under Secretary of the Army. When I
was there, we had several Under Secretaries,
but the one that was the most fun was Mr.
Augustine. Norm Augustine. He was just an
absolute delight to work for. In 1976, he had
just moved up from being the Assistant Secre-
tary for R&D, and he moved up to be the Under
Secretary. He believed that the Army didn’t
have enough money for acquisition so he
wanted to put together this briefing so that we
could go around and get more money for the
Army. I ended up being the action officer on
this thing, so I spent the whole year making
briefing charts and flipping charts for Mr. Au-
gustine, and got a medal for it. I got an Army
Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. It’s a fairly
high award for making view graphs and flip-
ping charts, but I tell you, every chart in this
briefing had a whole file folder. I had a whole
file cabinet that was full of this briefing, be-
cause we kept adding charts and taking them
out and it was a 40-chart briefing, but it was
never the same forty charts. The briefing was
called Equipping the Army. What Mr. Augus-
tine would do was he would go around to all
these different people in OSD and other ser-
vices, and anybody that would listen to him.
He’d say, “Look, I’m putting together this brief-
ing to go give to somebody else.” He never
would say who it was at the time. “Now I want
you to help me here.” So he would go through
and immediately he has the whole audience—
whoever it is, cooperating. Of course, that’s his
real audience, and they’re telling him, “Well,
Norm, no, you ought to change this chart and
make this way or that way.” And he accepted
all suggestions. “Okay. Right. That’s a great
idea. Write that down.” I was back there where
I could flip the charts and write the notes down.
And we had a chart that had these columns on
it and they were filled up as a bar chart that
showed the percentage of the authorized acqui-
sition projecting what we actually had on hand.
So now it was percent fill. It was tanks, and
APCs and the like. They were filled up and they
were green. If we briefed that one, the audience
would invariably say, “No, you really ought to
emphasize the part that’s not there.” We ought
to color the top part. So Norm says, “Right, we
ought to do that.” Well, that’s the one we
would use on the next iteration. We had two
versions of the authorized acquisition objective
field chart—the stalactite and the stalagmite.
And this went on and on for six months. When
it was all done, we got almost a billion dollars
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added to the Army procurement accounts over
the program years. We could have gotten more,
but we didn’t have anything ready to buy at the
time hardly. We could mostly buy stuff that we
already had in production, but that’s like
M113s and some of the artillery pieces and
helicopters. But remember, we had the big five
in development and they didn’t become avail-
able to be bought until the 1980s, so we were a
little early for that. Mr. Augustine thought that
we could have gotten a lot more money if we’d
have had something to buy with it that was
really sexy.
BOB SHELDON: This is during the Carter
administration?
E.B. VANDIVER: It ended up being right
at the end of the Ford administration and then,
of course, during the Carter administration, a
lot of that stuff dissipated. We went down
again after that. Dr. Payne was only there about
another year and a half after I arrived, and in
November of 1975, he left to go down to Train-
ing Doctrine Command and head up their
whole analysis activity. General DePuy went
and got the old Safeguard Systems Analysis
Activity, got it transferred to TRADOC, that
was about three or four hundred people down
at the White Sands Missile Range, and con-
verted it to be his analysis organization. Now
they’re almost all missile engineers of one kind
or another, but the Safeguard program was
shut down otherwise they’d been out of work.
So Wilbur went down there to retread these
guys and make analysts out of them, OR
analysts, and that became TRASANA, the
TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity, that Wil-
bur Payne headed up. Then Dave Hardison
became the DUSA(OR) and I worked for him
until 1977. Abe Golub retired from the staff in
1976. Now when ACSFOR went away in 1974,
Abe’s office went over into DCSOPS. His new
job was the DCSOPS Technical Advisor. I suc-
ceeded as the Technical Advisor in DCSOPS in
March 1977. I’m a GS-17. Abe had become an
eighteen, but I got it as a seventeen. Two years
later the super grades went away when they
created the Senior Executive Service. I’m a char-
ter member of the Senior Executive Service. The
Senior Executive Service was kind of all the
same, so it’s hard to tell who’s what. The
DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations)
was LTG Shy Meyer. I was Technical Advisor
to him. He was succeeded by LTG Glenn Otis
and then by LTG Bill Richardson, and then at
the very end by LTG Fred Mahaffey. After that
I went to CAA in 1984. On the first of October
2004 I had been here at CAA for twenty years.
BOB SHELDON: Your job in 1977, was
that a change in position?
E.B. VANDIVER: I had been in the secre-
tariat in DUSA(OR) and this was back on the
staff in a major staff agency. This was the office
in the G3 in the Army, Operations, Plans and
Training, and actually one of the main things I
did was I dealt with CAA because they were a
DCSOPS agency. They did most of their studies
for us, so I helped get them started, and sat on
the advisory groups for them. I helped take the
studies around and explain them when they
were done. It was the kind of a staff job that
analysts do.
BOB SHELDON: Who was the head of
CAA in 1977?
E.B. VANDIVER: It was MG Ennis White-
head. After him came MG Ted Atkinson. In
1982, they civilianized the job and then came
Dave Hardison, who had since then gone up to
OSD came back and became the first civilian
director of CAA. He stayed there until 1984 and
I succeeded him.
BOB SHELDON: Was CAA at Bethesda,
Maryland?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, it was. It had been
at Bethesda since 1960, because the main pre-
decessor organization had been there. This was
STAG, Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group.
There are very few people who know STAG.
(One of the walls in Payne Hall has a large
black and white symbol of a deer with the
wording STAG nearby; that was their emblem.)
There aren’t very many people left around who
were even in it. But there are a few. John Bat-
tilega is one person who was at STAG as a
Major.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have relation-
ships with the other analytic agencies out at
White Sands or was it primarily with CAA?
E.B. VANDIVER: We had an awful lot
of interaction with TRADOC because of the
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses
(COEAs) being done. These all came through
DCSOPS since DCSOPS was responsible for
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them. I sat on the Study Advisory Groups
(SAGs) for almost every COEA done for years
there and I attended all of the Army System’s
Acquisition Review Council, the ASARCs, and
the pre-ASARCs. Thousands of the things it
seems like over the years, so it was an awful lot
of work on systems acquisition. I want to go
back to ACSFOR for a little. At the end of 1973
and the beginning of 1974, coming out of Viet-
nam, the Army recognized that the force struc-
ture was totally out of line with the operations
plans. Because we had been fighting a war in
Southeast Asia, the structure just really didn’t
match up with any of the current planned op-
erations. So the DCSOPS asked ACSFOR to do
a study on this thing. Abe got tasked, so I
ended up doing it. We had a planning system
that I adapted to it in which we ran wargames
against the Soviet threat in Central Europe and
then we rounded out the force with all the
support forces, and then we matched that up
against what was actually in the force structure
and see what was over and what was under.
The first time we did that we found 600,000
structure spaces mismatched. That is, ones that
we needed but we didn’t have, or we had and
we didn’t need. This study was called Total
Force Analysis. That’s essentially the way the
Total Army Analysis is still being done. I mean,
the literal descendant of it is TAA today; it’s an
unbroken chain of them. I did the first one, and
I’m still doing them. We’re doing TAA 13 here
just starting off right now. But it’s been so long
ago that nobody knows that I started it, so I
don’t get credit or blame for it.
BOB SHELDON: When you were at
DUSA(OR), you worked with Wilbur Payne.
Any Wilbur Payne stories to tell?
E.B. VANDIVER: He was always saying
things that were quotable. But one of my favor-
ite ones, some contractor came in with a pro-
posal to take some Navy missile that the Navy
had decided not to buy, but they had the de-
sign, and tested it, and mounted it on a truck
and used it for some kind of Army system.
They cobbled together one of these type things
and they’d gone and tested it, and it didn’t do
all that well either, but they were still trying to
sell the thing. Dr. Payne’s comment was, “It
was a bad idea, poorly executed.” {Laughter}
There’s a whole book of those things by the
way that was put together by Warren Olsen
and others. But there’s just no end to these
unique things from Dr. Payne. He was so smart.
BOB SHELDON: How did you compete
for the CAA job?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was in the SES and it’s
an SES position. So I just went up and talked to
the DAS—the Director of Army Staff. Well, first
of all I had to talk with the DCSOPS, General
Mahaffey, and told him that I wanted it. He
said, “We’ll try and get it for you.” Then I went
and talked to the Director of Army Staff, who
was General Lee, and told him that I wanted
the job and General Mahaffey supported it.
And he said, “Well, I’ll check. I’ll ask the Vice.”
The Vice who was General Max Thurman said,
“Okay” so I just got it. I mean you can do that
in the SES. It’s a directed reassignment.
BOB SHELDON: Did the vacancy just
come open and you knew it was coming?
E.B. VANDIVER: It came open in May.
Dave announced in May that he would be re-
tiring the first of October. He let me know that
as soon as he knew that he was going to retire.
I went around and told everybody I wanted it
and they said, “Fine.” Let’s see, that was 1984.
The Chief was General John Wickham. I was
pretty close with General Wickham and also
with General Max Thurman. I was on General
Wickham’s transition team which was headed
up by Brigadier General Colin Powell.
BOB SHELDON: How large was CAA
when you took charge?
E.B. VANDIVER: It was about 300. It’s
gone down steadily ever since I’ve been there.
It’s less than half of that now. Every year I’ve
been here, it’s gotten smaller. It peaked in the
1970s at 325. When I got there, I think it was
about 280, but with college students and interns
and some others there was about 300 actually in
the building.
BOB SHELDON: Of those 300, what was
the mix?
E.B. VANDIVER: It was about one-third,
two-thirds, military to civilian. I’ve almost been
able to keep that ratio, but I’m losing it now
with military to civilian conversions. But the
military were about half analysts, functional
area 49s, the rest were other functional areas.
They had come there for their functional exper-
tise. There’s a quartermaster, an engineer,
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there’s everything in the other groups. The ci-
vilians were all technical of one kind or an-
other. They are from information technology,
science, engineering, operations research, and
all types of backgrounds. Except for the admin-
istrative staff, which was also a rather large
organization.
BOB SHELDON:Did you also send a lot of
your military folks to Fort Lee for training at
ALMC (Army Logistics Management College)?
Or did they come to you trained?
E.B. VANDIVER: No. The ALMC ORSA
MAC I course (Operations Research/Systems
Analysis Military Applications Course I)
started up in—actually the first course finished
in October of 1977. I remember it vividly be-
cause I was the first graduation speaker at
MAC I. The DCSOPS was the proponent and
the headquarters for Functional Area 49 (FA
49). I had the responsibility as the DCSOPS
Tech Advisor and helped set up the MAC I
course. General Meyer, the DCSOPS, was to go
down to be the graduation speaker. Well at 5:00
the afternoon before, he calls my office and
says, “Hey Van, old buddy, I’m supposed to go
give a graduation speech tomorrow. I can’t go.
You go do it for me.” I says, “Okay, you got any
charts or anything?” He says, “No, I was just
going to go talk to them about DCSOPS.”
{Laughter} I go home with a fresh pack of cig-
arettes and a bottle of Scotch, stayed up until
midnight, wrote out my notes, and went down
and gave the first graduation speech. I give one
MAC I graduation address a year even today. I
recently did one in December.
BOB SHELDON: What did you talk to
them about?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was in DCSOPS at the
time, so I talked to them about what the impor-
tant things were going on in the headquarters
and what were the important kinds of analysis
that related to that work. And depending on
where they were going after coming out of this
class, what they might be getting involved with
on their first ORSA job. I had no visuals or
anything, just had an outline of everything.
BOB SHELDON: Are any students from
the audience still in the community?
E.B. VANDIVER: General Ben Griffin, the
four-star Commander of AMC—Captain Grif-
fin was in the audience. I ended up working for
him. Just until a couple of months ago, he was
the G8 and he was my boss. He has never
stopped reminding people that I was his grad-
uation speaker. {Laughter} But he’s the only
one. That was a long time ago. There ain’t no-
body from that time frame left on active duty
now unless they’re a four-star general.
BOB SHELDON: What were the chal-
lenges in your early days at CAA?
E.B. VANDIVER: The CAA, in my mind,
and I had watched them for many years, had
several failings, or things that I considered to be
failings. They seemed to be awfully inefficient
and it was very difficult to get a major force
study done—it was just very slow. They didn’t
do very many studies and it took a long time to
get them done. But that was characteristic of all
analysis, by the way. It was just very difficult to
do a lot of things back then that today are
simple.
BOB SHELDON: You say it took a long
time to get them done?
E.B. VANDIVER: I was just going to get to
that. We would do a major force study and it
would include a base case run of say the central
front against the Soviet hordes of 90 days in
Central Europe. The study would have maybe a
base case and two variants of it. It would take a
year to do it, and probably include a dozen
people. We do things like that sometimes now
with ten or twelve cases before breakfast. I
mean, the change of scale is just fantastic. So it
was just extremely difficult to do things. Every-
thing was running on a humongous mainframe
computer, a UNISYS 1184, and you had to put
these huge card decks in, then you got these
giant printouts from the thing. You were just
getting the first graphics terminals coming
out—they were humongous things. It was the
size of that couch. I showed you the picture of
them down in my museum. So it was very
difficult to do things just because of the IT, the
information technology aspect, but also be-
cause of very inefficient processes. I started
making everybody sit down and describe—al-
right, you run a simulation, tell me what you
had to do—you describe what you have to do
to make a new case, step-by-step. What’s ev-
erything you have to do? And now you start
collecting data on that as you do these things.
Let’s find out what takes the most time, what
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takes the most effort, and what introduces the
most error. And whatever those three things
are, let’s go do something to change them. Then
keep collecting data and then find out what’s
the next three, and just keep doing it. And
eventually it will take no time, no effort, and
it’ll be error free. But we don’t have to worry
about that. We hadn’t got there quite yet. Just
doing that on some of our key processes made
a huge difference.
BOB SHELDON: What were those three
things?
E.B. VANDIVER: One of the things—it’s
kind of staggering to think about it now—was
in using the big theater combat simulation
CEM, the Concepts Evaluation Model, which
was kind of a bread and butter theater combat
simulation, where you could not incrementally
modify a case. You had to go back and create all
of the files from scratch each time you wanted
another case. It’s just hard to believe it could
have been that way, but it was. Changing that
aspect alone made a huge difference. I got there
at the end of 1984. And getting this in place in
’85, ’86, ’87 is when the revolution in IT was just
coming along. PCs were coming in then. The
Army starts its supercomputer network and we
get an account on that. So we can batch it up,
we can run two or three dozens simulation runs
at a time on this thing. I used to keep data. I had
charts on how many cases we would do in a
year. In the late 1980s, from ’85 to the early ’90s,
we went from maybe a couple of dozen a year
to hundreds a year, and things were rolling.
Those were the biggest things we were doing in
the late ’80s and then the Cold War ended.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s backtrack to your
MORS participation.
E.B. VANDIVER: The first MORSS I went
to was in 1966. It was the 18th MORSS. It was
after I’d come back from Vietnam. Then I went
to the one in 1968 out at the Air Force Acad-
emy, when I had my own company. After that
I went to work on the Army staff, I couldn’t get
anybody to let me go. Abe Golub wouldn’t let
anybody go. Wilbur was the sponsor for the
thing and Hunter Woodall always went. He
was the only one. Until we get up to 1979, and
Hunter couldn’t go and so they asked me if I
would. So I finally got to go to a MORS. It was
up at the Military Academy in 1979. I didn’t go
again after that because DUSA(OR) locked the
thing up and didn’t want anybody going unless
they were giving a paper, and I didn’t have
any. But 1982 was the year of disaster for
MORS. That was the one where one of the
services wouldn’t send anybody to it. Several
sponsors thought it had turned into a ‘chowder
and marching society‘ and really objected to the
two symposia a year. It was too often and there
weren’t enough good papers to support it, and
they really wanted it cut back to one, and
MORS refused to do it. So one or two services
refused to send anybody to it, and that was the
two-by-four between the eyes that got their
attention. Then right about that same time—
and I can’t remember who it was, asked me if I
would like to be on the Board and I said, “Sure,
why not.” I was known to be quite a critic of
MORS at the time. I was elected to the Board in
June of 1983, and then attended the first Board
meeting in December. It was a two-day Board
meeting. It was just absolutely incredible. Pole-
vaulting over mouse turds. It was staggering.
There was still a lot of sentiment to go back to
the two big symposia a year instead of the deal
that had been worked out with the sponsors
which was one big symposia a year, and then
use special sessions to do other things. I became
a member of the Board and I was a big oppo-
nent of having the two big symposia a year,
although that died very hard in MORS. I don’t
think there’s any sentiment anymore for that. I
think that’s all gone finally. Probably because
the people who were the biggest proponents for
that are finally all gone. The special meetings,
of course, have continued on. I was on the
Board for four years and I was the Vice Presi-
dent for Professional Affairs (VPPA). Then the
year I would have run for President, I didn’t
because I was having a lot of trouble at home
with one of my children, who got in all kinds of
trouble and I think needed my attention so I
didn’t run. So I left the Board that year and then
got re-elected again later, so I started all over
again.
BOB SHELDON: What issues did you
tackle as VP for Professional Affairs?
E.B. VANDIVER: I started the colloquium
on education as a one-time thing; that’s still
going on.
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BOB SHELDON:What was the impetus of
that first one?
E.B. VANDIVER: I just thought it was
something that we ought to do. I had been on
the Education Committee and there really
wasn’t much going on there, so when I became
the VPPA, I said, “Well we’ll do something in
education, so let’s get together the people from
the military academies, AFIT and the Naval
Postgraduate School, and let’s talk about edu-
cating people in military OR.” I thought it
would just be a one-time thing. We’d publish a
special report and maybe three or four years
later you’d do another one or something—
maybe five years. But then the thing has con-
tinued. It’s gone on and there has been one
every year ever since.
Anyway I got back on the Board and I went
exactly up the same track I went up the first
time. I headed the Education Committee. I
headed a couple other committees, too. I had
the Management Committee. I did a special
study on the pay for the staff using two or three
different methods. I had a big impact on that.
And then we come up to 1992, I ran for Presi-
dent and was elected President in 92 to 93. Then
I was Past President and so I was on the Board
there for about fifteen years. I’d done an awful
lot of things and still do things now and then.
BOB SHELDON: The year you were Pres-
ident, what were the big issues?
E.B. VANDIVER: I ran on the platform of
MORS not as an organization that just holds
meetings, but it’s a full professional society that
provides a full array of professional services. I
got some things started that we had been work-
ing on for a lot of years, but never got off the
ground. The Handbook of OR, I got that started.
The Military OR Journal, I got that started. I did
the first ‘State of the Society’ address, and I
started the Heritage Committee and the Heri-
tage Program. I had a really neat thing. I had a
one-page program that had on one sheet of
paper, front and back, each committee and
what their major things were they were sup-
posed to do that year. I understand that it grew
to be thirty or forty pages long and then got
killed. When it was one page, it was really quite
effective, and that’s what I used when I went
into a Council meeting or when we had a Board
meeting. Those are probably all the main things
I did.
BOB SHELDON: MOR Journal, what was
the concept behind that?
E.B. VANDIVER: The concept was that
there was no good place—no good refereed
journal for publishing applications of Military
OR. That the ORSA Journal, the Operations Re-
search Society of America really liked theory
and wouldn’t publish papers on practice.
About the only scholarly journal that we were
able to get them published was the Naval Re-
search Logistics journal, but who reads that? You
didn’t have the right audience there. So there
was a lot of sentiment, and there had been for
years. I didn’t originate this idea. I just made it
happen. You know, let’s do this. We’ve been
talking about it forever, let’s do it. Greg Parnell
was the big mover. He succeeded me as Presi-
dent, too.
BOB SHELDON: As President of MORS,
were there any controversial issues?
E.B. VANDIVER: Absolutely none. It was
1992 and 1993. The Cold War’s over. Desert
Shield, Desert Storm’s over. We tried to figure
out what the Defense Department ought to look
like. It was actually a fairly calm period in the
Defense Department. Relationships were pretty
good with the sponsors. We had a lot of special
meetings. I neglected to mention that in 1991 I
ran the MORS special meeting on analysis les-
sons learned from Desert Shield, Desert Storm.
At the end of the meeting, I had Clayton
Thomas, who had a group of people who sat in
on each of the sessions, brief out a summary of
the meeting. This was the first special meeting
Synthesis Group. So I instigated that, too. I
understand they’re still doing that. I invented
the Synthesis Group, so that when the meeting
was over, you would immediately have a prod-
uct that you could publish into PHALANX. This
is the bottom line of the meeting, and then
you’d get a report later. Actually, on the special
meeting on lessons learned from Desert Shield,
Desert Storm, I’m not sure the report ever was
published on that.
BOB SHELDON: It probably would have
been classified.
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, it was. It was held at
a secret level. It was over at the Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA). It was in November of
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1991, so things were pretty fresh. There was
quite a bit of material from all services, and
that’s a good sign. The report of the Synthesis
Group which I had was written up. I had that
put into the next PHALANX that came out.
BOB SHELDON: You encourage MORS
participation for your folks at CAA. Do you
coax them with a cattle prod or do you just let
them volunteer?
E.B. VANDIVER: It’s a little bit of both. I
like people to go to professional society meet-
ings. For the Army OR symposiums just down
at Petersburg, Virginia, I send all the new peo-
ple—I send all kinds of people because it’s
fairly inexpensive. MORS happens to meet in
expensive places, so sending a large contingent
to Monterey or to Colorado Springs is a little
high. My rule is that you can go to a profes-
sional society meeting if you are presenting a
paper or you have an official post, but then
sometimes I let a few other people go. That gets
a pretty good turnout.
BOB SHELDON: What’s the origin of
AORS? Does that precede MORS or did that
come after MORS?
E.B. VANDIVER: I believe it precedes it.
That was started by Griff Callaghan back in
1959 or 1960. When OR was really getting
started good in the Army. Originally it met
down at Huntsville or Rock Island, then at
Duke University at the Army Research Office,
which was on the Duke University campus,
Durham, North Carolina. Dr. Marion Bryson
was the Scientific Advisor there and he had a
big interest in it. Griff Callaghan got the Army
Research Office (ARO) and Dr. Bryson to spon-
sor the thing. It met there several years up 1973.
The last one presented down at ARO was in
1973, and I know because I was the program
chairman of it. Abe had picked it up—the Chief
of Research and Development didn’t want it
anymore, so Abe Golub says he’d do it and then
he turns to me and he says, “You take care of
the thing.” Then he says, “Make this the best
AORS ever, but don’t spend any time on it.” So
you know what that means. I spent all my
Saturdays working on it. That was the last one
that was held down on the campus at Duke.
Because by then, the Vietnam War was going
on and universities didn’t want anything to do
with the military, so ARO moved off of the
campus and that was the last of that. We then
moved the Army OR symposium to Fort Lee,
Virginia and it’s been there ever since.
BOB SHELDON: What is the difference
between AORS and MORS in terms of a sym-
posium?
E.B. VANDIVER: AORS is unclassified. It
is all Army. It includes a lot of stuff that you
would never get to, with junior analysts and
lower level kinds of work, stuff that you’d
never get to see at a MORS. We encourage all
the junior analysts to go to the thing to see what
Army analysis is like. It’s a bit of a culture sort
of thing for analysts. It has since been copied by
the Navy and the Air Force. AORS doesn’t
really compete with MORS. That was one of the
first things I attended to when I got on the
MORS Board of Directors. I had Hork Dimon
come see me and say, “You know, the Army is
giving MORS a hard time because you’ve got
the AORS and you’re trying to support that at
the expense of MORS.” No, it’s not either. It’s a
totally different thing. MORS has its own fail-
ings that need to be fixed. AORS is not part of
it. So in fact, at one of the early Board meetings
I went to, I gave them a briefing about AORS.
Here’s how it’s different and here’s why there’s
really no conflict here. The other services even-
tually came around to the same point of view
and decided, “Hey, we need something like
this, too.” And that’s okay. Again, there’s no
conflict.
BOB SHELDON: Has attendance at AORS
stayed stable over the years?
E.B. VANDIVER: No, it’s gone down. It
used to run 200 people a year for years and
years. Now it’s down to about 150.
BOB SHELDON: Is it still the same nature
of unclassified briefings on topical areas of in-
terest?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. We’ve had classi-
fied sessions at times and decided it was just
too much hassle. We’ve got a lot of methodol-
ogy stuff, so it’s okay. It doesn’t have to be
classified. MORS gives us the classified stuff,
anyhow.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s continue on with
your CAA work in the 1990s. What were the
major challenges you had to face after the
drawdown of the Cold War?
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E.B. VANDIVER: The drawdown went on
all through the 1990s. I had a big drawdown
there in the early ’90s and we had a lot of
military officers that had to go out. They had
those programs where you could get out after
fifteen years. We had a lot of disruption
through the years there, and we were shrinking
in size. We actually reorganized to accommo-
date that. We reorganized it to accommodate a
new way of doing business. We had done so
much during Desert Shield and Desert Storm
we had never done before. We had gotten so
efficient at doing some of these things that it
really changed the whole way we did business
there. So we had a series of reorganizations,
incremental reorganizations through the 1990s
to reduce layering, take better advantage of the
way we were actually doing things. Getting
better in support of ongoing operations, which
has led where we are today where I’ve got two
analysts in Afghanistan, two in Iraq. I rotate
them on six-month tours. I’ve got 15–20 projects
going on back here supporting them. This is
stuff we could only dream about ten or fifteen
years ago.
BOB SHELDON: You mentioned the turn-
around in computer time now. Going from 300
people down to 150, do you feel you can ac-
complish as much or more work than was done
twenty years ago?
E.B. VANDIVER: They do more. We’re flat
doing more. We do a lot more with 150 than I
did with 200, or even 300.
BOB SHELDON: How do you feel about
the skill sets of your analysts that are working
for you now as compared to twenty years ago?
E.B. VANDIVER: Much better, especially
with military. They were always pretty good,
and now they’re superb. Civilians have just
about matched them because I’m recruiting
through the Presidential Management Intern
Program. Skill levels are higher. Efficiency is
higher. Training is better. Everything from my
point of view is orders of magnitude, more
capable, more professional, and more respon-
sive than it was. But it has only taken me
twenty years to get it like this, and we’ve still
got a long way to go.
BOB SHELDON: How do you feel about
your graduates of the ORSA MAC I (Opera-
tions Research/Systems Analysis Military Ap-
plications Course I) compared to those going
through your graduate OR programs at Geor-
gia Tech or elsewhere?
E.B. VANDIVER: The standard for Func-
tional Area 49 to be fully qualified is a Masters
Degree in Operations Research. So that’s
mostly your graduates of the Air Force Institute
of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School,
Georgia Institute of Technology, and the Colo-
rado School of Mines. This is one method, or
they need a Masters Degree in a technical sub-
ject plus ALMC ORSA MAC I. So MAC I is not
a substitute for the graduate degree in OR. It’s
MAC I plus a Masters Degree in what the reg-
ulation calls an associated subject or related
subject. That includes anything technical—
Math, Science, Computer Science, MBA. You’ve
got to have a Masters in one of those things and
complete MAC I. These folks do pretty good
studies with this background. The ones with
the Masters Degrees in OR do better on devel-
opmental things. The ones with Ph.D.s do best
of all on developmental things. I’ve always got
a fair number of military Ph.D.s, and they’re the
ones I usually turn to, to do something brand
new. Something we haven’t done before.
BOB SHELDON: We transition into the
2000s with fighting another war over in the
Gulf and with Afghanistan. The analysts that
you send into the field of combat, so to speak,
are coming back. What do you try to grab out of
them when they come back?
E.B. VANDIVER: First of all, they go back
into working the reach-back analysis as they’re
supporting the ones that are forward. They
know the theatre, and know the climate, the
environment and whatnot. Some of them leave
after they come back, but for the ones that do
come back and stay for a while, I put them back
in support of it. Plus they’re working the sce-
narios for that part of the world and other
scenarios as well. So far I’ve been able to send
all volunteers. Some of them I had to twist their
arm a little harder than others, but they all
volunteered, and we’ve had three civilians go,
too. They have to be real volunteers. Two of
them went, each for three months, and the third
one went for six months. Then I couldn’t get
anybody to go. I was trying to keep one mili-
tary and one civilian with the Corps headquar-
ters there in Baghdad, and then I couldn’t get a
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civilian that would stay over Christmas, so I
had to put in two military—actually I had a
military who volunteered who said he’d go for
Christmas. I’ve got two different headquarters
in Afghanistan, and one of those requirements
goes away soon. I originally looked for people
who—because we weren’t established—had
sharp elbows and were not bashful and would
elbow their way up. I needed people who were
like Max Moore, Allison Stewart, and Rob Kew-
ley, to get these things going. Since then, we’ve
become established and they use us. We’re the
working end of the thing. They brief General
Casey and LTG Metz every Monday morning
on their analysis. We’re thoroughly part of
things. So now I just make sure I send good
analysts over there. And I’m still getting volun-
teers, real volunteers.
BOB SHELDON: The wartime applica-
tions of OR—we read about the origins of it
during World War II. Would you view it as a
comparable level of effectiveness to World War
II or more effective?
E.B. VANDIVER: The U.S. Army didn’t
really have a lot of OR in World War II. It had
none in the Pacific. In fact, the best OR that was
done in the European Theatre was done by the
historians. Guys like SLA Marshall were in the
Military History Detachment so the Army
didn’t have much of a history with OR in
World War II. Now they had a very good ex-
perience in the Korean War, because between
the end of World War II and Korea, ORO was
started. ORO was the Operations Research Of-
fice in Johns Hopkins University. They sent a
big bunch of analysts over to Korea, including
SLA Marshall. They stayed throughout the Ko-
rean War and provided lots of support, had a
good reputation, and were very highly thought
of. So I would say that the work we’re doing
now was more comparable to that, because we
don’t really have any baseline for World War II
like the Eighth Air Force and the Navy did with
OEG (Operations Evaluation Group). But it’s
very similar in a lot of ways—although things
had moved along in a lot of ways that are very
different now from World War II and Korea,
too. The effects-based operations and goal
structures that are put together today all have
metrics on them. All the commands are using
their OR analysts to help them with that. What
is effects-based? This is the kind of stuff we do
anyway. So we’ve been very much involved in
that both in Afghanistan and Iraq with several
military headquarters.
BOB SHELDON: Of the OR skill sets such
as statistics and math programming and simu-
lation, which are the most useful ones that you
see in your analysts?
E.B. VANDIVER: The most commonly
used analytical technique both here at Fort Bel-
voir and over in the theaters is Microsoft Office.
They are powerful tools. They have a statistical
package and a map display package. They’re
very good because you’re always manipulating
a lot of data that you’re collecting both here and
there. Discrete event simulation is useful for a
lot of problems and we use Pro Model for that.
Now on a recurring analysis, we also use the
theater level simulations and the standard sim-
ulations for air defense like EADSIM (Extended
Air Defense Simulation). We use JICM (Joint
Integrated Contingency Model) for the theater
combat simulation. But a lot of things are more
like, create a model. That is, create a model to fit
the situation, more along the classical lines and
the experience in the theater is feeding back to
that, too. One of the things I tried to do and
used it as a slogan is ‘Putting the Operations
back into Operations Research’ and I think
we’ve done a pretty good job of that.
BOB SHELDON: What advice would you
give to young analysts starting a career in OR?
E.B. VANDIVER: The first thing I’d do is
tell them to get over and see what a theater of
operations looks like. Go to Afghanistan or go
to Iraq. These things won’t last forever. There’s
no other way to get the experience than to go to
a real one. Otherwise, all you’re doing is read-
ing history. All of my Presidential Management
Interns desperately want to go, but we can’t
send them and I queried the office up at the
Secretary of the Army about sending them, and
they just came totally unglued at the thought
that I would send one of these Presidential
Management Interns over—although they all
want to go. So once I get them converted, I’ll
send them. But that’s the first thing I’d tell
them. Get over there—if you can, get over to
see what an active theater of operations looks
like. They’re messier than hell. You’ve got to
see it to believe it, what a mess a real war is. If
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anything, I tell them, get up—get into the
building [the Pentagon] and go learn what the
environment is of the people who actually end
up using this stuff to make decisions. That’s an
eye-opener, too. And so I have my strategic
partners program where I go take people
through, with my sponsors, into the building
and it is always a very enlightening experience
for them to find out this is the way the building
really works.
BOB SHELDON: How long do you leave
them in there?
E.B. VANDIVER: Up to a year. I try to get
them at least a year, sometime two, sometimes
even three. Some of them really get into it and
like staying there. But one to two years. Two
years is better—it’s a good length of time. I’ve
got four slots going there. And it’s a fabulous
educational thing. You ought to have at least a
Masters Degree in a technical subject. You
ought to go to the force management school,
and I make everybody go to that over here at
General Richard G. Trefry’s school. That’s the
course on how the big green machine runs. I try
to get all my civilians to go to the Army Man-
agement Staff College which they bill as the
civilian Command and General Staff College.
I’ve got my professional civilians up to 50% of
them now have been to that. Nobody else in the
Army comes close to that figure. In fact, I track
those three things on the work force for both
military and civilians.
BOB SHELDON: It is 1400 on the 28th of
March 2005 and Mike Garrambone and I are
here at the Center for Army Analysis, Wilbur
Payne Hall at Fort Belvoir, Virginia to continue
our third session of our oral history interview
with Mr. E.B. Vandiver. As I look around the
rooms here at CAA, I see many pictures of the
Civil War. What’s the origin of your interest in
the Civil War?
E.B. VANDIVER: When I was in the first
grade, it was the last year of World War II. That
winter, which would’ve been January or Feb-
ruary 1945, I saw the movie, Gone with the Wind
or at least I saw most of Gone with the Wind,
because when they got to the scene there in
Atlanta where they sawed that guy’s leg off
without the anesthetic I had to leave the the-
ater. That’s where my original interest in the
Civil War started. I thought it was called the
Silver War, but then when you’re only in the
first or second grade, that’s close enough. But
that’s where my interest started and has not
abated since. In fact, it has gotten worse.
BOB SHELDON: You give these Civil War
history tours. Tell us about these field trips.
E.B. VANDIVER: They are staff rides.
They are not field trips. There is a very distinct
difference between the two.
BOB SHELDON: What is the difference?
E.B. VANDIVER: In a field trip you go out
to learn about the battle or the campaign. In a
staff ride you go out and use the battle or the
campaign to illustrate some point in military art
and science. Mine are all staff rides, they’re not
field trips. I had other people doing them for
years. I’ve had people from the Chief of Mili-
tary History’s Office, and others like Dr. Mi-
chael Krause for example. He ran some for me,
but it was always as a staff ride. We would
always pick a point: here’s the subject we are
going to use this staff ride to talk about. We did
Gettysburg a lot back then. We would also do
Antietam a lot. One time we’d talk about intel-
ligence, next time we’d talk about command
and control. We’d talk about some principle or
two of war and use a part on logistics or what-
ever subject was of interest. I just started devel-
oping my own staff rides because I never
thought that anybody else ever did them ex-
actly right. I’ve done a Wilderness, Spotsylva-
nia one that I use to illustrate the birth of mod-
ern warfare. I then put a new one together on
Chancellorsville, and my theme in that one is
the use of maneuver to offset numerical inferi-
ority.
BOB SHELDON: Do you have any geneal-
ogy going back to the Civil War?
E.B. VANDIVER: I have written papers on
my ancestors in the Civil War. My great grand-
father Vandiver, and his father, my great great
grandfather Vandiver, were both in the Civil
War. My great grandfather’s brother was killed
over in Harper’s Ferry with the 7th South Caro-
lina Infantry. My great great grandfather’s
brother was in the 2nd South Carolina Rifles
but he left after a year or so and ran for the
South Carolina House of Representatives—and
was elected. I’ve got cousins, that is cousins by
the dozens, that were in the war. And I have a
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Yankee great grandfather, but don’t tell any-
one.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You’ve kept up
with history and you’ve had several research-
ers look at history for you. Two gentlemen
immediately come to mind. One is Trevor Du-
puy and the other one is Bob Helmbold. Bob
worked for you here at CAA. He did studies
involving Lanchester models. You not only
thought about it, but you also had these special
gentlemen research it for you. Why these gen-
tlemen?
E.B. VANDIVER: These gentlemen put it
to use. The use of historical data in military
operations research is frequently spoken of but
seldom done mainly because it takes a lot of
work. As a rule, historians don’t keep quanti-
tative records. So if you want to take historical
experience and turn it in to quantitative things,
it takes hard work. Trevor’s old outfit, Histor-
ical Evaluation and Research Organization
(HERO), which is now The Dupuy Institute
(TDI) did that kind of work for me. I still have
them under contract for doing things. They did
a great piece of work for me a few years back on
enemy prisoner of war capture rates, and we
have used that today in the support force struc-
turing process to determine how many MPs
(Military Police) you need to guard enemy pris-
oners of war (EPWs). So we’ve made very prac-
tical use on that research. I’ve had them do
work on researching urban warfare and
counter insurgencies more recently. They’ve
turned up very useful things in these areas. I
hear people say, “all you need to do is go to the
historical data,” like there is this bookshelf
someplace, and you just go there and just reach
up and grab a volume. No, it is not that way. If
you want it, you have to first define your prob-
lem, and then go find the data, collect it and
analyze it, and put it in a format where you can
begin to use it.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Bob Helmbold
did research on various rates such as maneu-
vers, and rates of march in combat.
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, he did rates of ad-
vance for me. I had him do a very comprehen-
sive study on rates of advance and he did a lot
of work on attrition kinds of formulations as
well. He’s doing well and lives in Arizona now
where he still plays around with these topics.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: A fellow that may
be on your list is Griff Callahan, the old colonel.
You mentioned him earlier. He was at Harry
Diamond Laboratory.
E.B. VANDIVER: He is a Professor Emer-
itus at Georgia Tech. He was one of the movers
behind establishing what is now the Functional
Area 49, career field of Operations Research
Systems Analyst and he was the founder of
the Army Operations Research Symposium
(AORS).
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Another fellow
you might know is Pete Reid from AMSAA
(Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity at
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland).
E.B. VANDIVER: I met Pete Reid when I
worked here for a contractor back in 1966. He
had long black hair and I had nice long brown
hair. Mine’s no longer brown and he’s got none.
{Laughter} Pete was one of the first people I met
at AMSAA many, many years ago.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did you know
Frank Grubbs?
E.B. VANDIVER: I knew Frank Grubbs
but not well. Frank was with the Ballistics Re-
search Laboratory (BRL). He was at Aberdeen
for the earlier things that went on at the
weapon system laboratory before AMSAA
came into being. Frank stayed in BRL rather
than go to AMSAA.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: He did a lot of
weapons system work that we used to talk
about in the ORSA MAC I taught at ALMC.
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, he was the author of
a text book that they used in MAC I. I think it
was a two volume set titled Engineering Design
Handbook: Army Weapons Systems Analysis.
(Note 1. This was the DARCOM (U.S. Army
Materiel Development and Readiness Com-
mand Pamphlet 706-101/102, November 1977/
October 1979). (Note 2. The Army materiel or-
ganization name changed over time. They were
first, Army Materiel Command (AMC), then it
changed to Defense Readiness Command
(DARCOM), then the name returned to AMC.)
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You were also a
promoter of the Florida Institute of Technology
(FIT) OR graduate program at Fort Lee. I think
you came down for the first OR graduating
class.
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E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, I helped set it up
when we needed a lot more qualified FA 49s.
This was back in the late 1970s and early 1980s
and we could not get enough quotas for fully-
funded graduate school. I helped set up the FIT
Program at Fort Lee for guys to work on a
masters after they finished their MAC I course.
A Major George Schneikert ran the MAC I
course then. He was also one of the leads on
getting an OR graduate program going with the
Florida Institute of Technology at Fort Lee. I
attended this first graduation and was fortu-
nate to get several fine officers from this first
FIT class as CAA analysts. The students first
attended the 14 week MAC I course before
starting their graduate program. This went for
a number of years and we got lots of good FA
49s out of that program but I believe it faded
away after a while.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Tell us about
your relationship with AMSAA.
E.B. VANDIVER: I have always been close
with AMSAA because they provide all the sys-
tems input data that I need. That goes back,
well, forever. Because they are the head of the
Joint Technical Coordinating Group and pub-
lish the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual.
This was Pete Reid’s baby. So AMSAA have
been and are the keepers and certifiers of all
weapon system data. So, everything I use, even
today, from single shot kill probability to lethal
area coverage all come through AMSAA.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: I’ve always had
problems figuring out who exactly you worked
for over the years. Would you clear this up for
everyone?
E.B. VANDIVER: Sure, CAA, either as the
Concepts Analysis Agency or the Center for
Army Analysis has always worked for Head-
quarters Department of the Army, and primar-
ily for the Army staff. Now who I report to
changes every few years, but it doesn’t seem to
make any difference. I support the same cus-
tomers in the same way.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So who do you
report to, is this DCSOPS or someone else?
E.B. VANDIVER: At the moment, that is,
under the latest Department of the Army reor-
ganization, I report to the G-8, the Deputy Chief
of Staff of Programs, who is LTG David F.
Melcher, who is a FA 49. So the FA 49 propo-
nency is back in the Army staff and it’s in the
G-8. Before that, for twenty-something years, I
reported to the Director of the Army Staff. Be-
fore that CAA reported to DCSOPS, before that
they reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Tell us what
prompted the move of CAA from Bethesda,
Maryland to Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
E.B. VANDIVER: BRAC 95, the Base Re-
alignment and Closure Commission. CAA was
sitting in a GSA leased building in Bethesda,
Maryland and it was the second most expen-
sive lease in the Army. It met the return on
investment payback criteria for new construc-
tion. As a result, we got a new building out of
this study. This building, Wilbur B. Payne Hall,
is the house that BRAC built. We’re the only
organization that was ever happy with BRAC.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Were you able to
assist in the design of this building?
E.B. VANDIVER:Absolutely. The Corps of
Engineers Baltimore District were the actual
designers of the thing and they worked very
closely with us.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was it precon-
ceived that CAA would come to Fort Belvoir?
E.B. VANDIVER: No. What the BRAC lan-
guage said was move CAA out of leased space
and move them either into new or renovated
facilities on an Army post in the Washington
area. It turned out the only other candidate was
Fort Meade, and they had renovated the old
Second Army Headquarters building there. I
was able to argue against that move since it
would take too long, with way too much traffic
to get back and forth to the Pentagon from Fort
Meade, as compared to Fort Belvoir, and they
agreed with that. So I got them to do the con-
struction down here.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: I know you are
going to help us identify with the name of the
building. I suspect that you had to think about
this and were very conscious of naming it Dr.
Wilbur B. Payne Hall.
E.B. VANDIVER: I thought about it for one
nanosecond. Wilbur Payne is one of the great
founding fathers of military OR in the Army.
He didn’t start it, okay you know that. It has
antecedents back to the Indian Wars, but it was
Dr. Payne who really got operations research
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going at high levels in the Army and institu-
tionalized it as a solid practice. So, he’s really a
founding father.
MIKE GARRAMBONE:Was he interested
in wargaming?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, he was. Wilbur
liked wargaming. He really liked military his-
tory. He and I liked the same kinds of things.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You have several
rooms in Payne Hall that appear to be set up for
wargames.
E.B. VANDIVER: The simulations that
we’re using today are really more like war-
games than the last generation’s simulations
were. TACWAR (Tactical Warfare) and CEM
(Concepts Evaluation Model) and IDAGAM
(Institute for Defense Analyses Ground-Air
Model) and that whole generation of simula-
tions, you had to just turn them on and they ran
the war. The current generation with JICM
(Joint Integrated Contingency Model) which
has been adopted pretty widely around—you
really have to operate it more like a computer
aided wargame because it doesn’t have any
high-level command and control. Somebody
has to act like the theater commander and tell it
what to do. CEM and TACWAR had logic in
them that you just gave them the general guid-
ance and they had rules that would try to carry
that guidance out. But you really have to play
in JICM like it is a wargame since it’s far more
of a wargame than the last generation of simu-
lations. I think this is good because you just
can’t write a rigid enough rule set to do these
things. It’s better to have a person intervening
to tell the model what to do.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How do you in-
terface with the Army War College?
E.B. VANDIVER: We interface very well,
but remember first of all they’re an educational
institution. Their mission is training people. We
do a certain amount of things together like look
at issues through workshops and political-mil-
itary games, and we assist them with those
events and they participate in ours. We meet
twice a year to coordinate things. We stay close
in touch and help each other.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Along the way
here today we’ve been talking about models.
And I don’t know what your philosophy is
whether you want to build them, buy them, use
them; what do you think is the best?
E.B. VANDIVER: Two things are best. One
is, don’t put a lot of money in them. If you will
notice the more money that goes into a simula-
tion development, the less likely it is to succeed.
It’s perfectly proportional. The worst thing you
can do is pour money on a simulation develop-
ment. Second is, it works best with an in-house
and contractor collaboration, and one in which
you take your time building it. It is best to
build, test, and build some more where the
government specifies the requirements while
the contractor helps with the design and then
the coding. You test it together and then con-
tinue in that cycle. We have been very success-
ful and built several major large simulations
following that model building mode and each
project came in at just a couple of million dol-
lars.
BOB SHELDON: Which models would
those be?
E.B. VANDIVER: That’s the GDAS, Global
Deployment Analysis System, which is a global
strategic ability deployment model. Another
one is MOBCEM, which is a model of mobili-
zation within the Continental United States.
The third is FORGE which generates support
force requirements. Meanwhile, several other
famous projects spent tons of money and were
either terminated or are still struggling.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You talked a little
bit about the tools. Where do you get your
analysts, and in particular, where do you get
your young analysts?
E.B. VANDIVER: Where they’re coming
from now? The military are supplied by the
military personnel center. My civilians, I’m get-
ting some of them now through a program
known as the Presidential Management Fel-
lows. It used to be called Presidential Manage-
ment Interns but thanks to some recent events,
the name ‘interns’ took on some bad connota-
tions. So they changed the name of it to Presi-
dential Management Fellows. This is a program
that recruits nationally.
It is run out of the Office of Personnel Man-
agement, and they bring in about 400 or 500 a
year. They got about 2,000 or more applicants
nationally and they screen it down to the hun-
dreds, and then they hold a big job fair in
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Washington where agencies go and set up a
booth, and the new fellows wander around and
people try to sell them on coming to their or-
ganization. In fact that happens tomorrow and
the next day and I’m going over to help work
the recruitment. We have been recruiting this
way for about five years or six years now.
We’ve been bringing in anywhere from one to
five a year. They come for two years. We send
them through all kinds of training courses,
which is centrally funded and give them expo-
sure to different places. I typically send them
up to the Army staff or maybe into OSD or over
to the State Department for a few months. And
then at the end of two years they can be non-
competitively selected in the series of their
choice. This has become a main source of re-
cruiting new people. There are absolutely su-
perb people in this program. I don’t get very
many, but I usually don’t need all that many at
the entry level. By the time they’ve been here
with us for two years in the Fellows program, I
have thoroughly “greened them.” They’re
ready, they’re all chomping at the bit, and they
want to go to Iraq and Afghanistan and they’re
running around shouting “Hooaah.” This is an
absolutely fabulous program. My other main
source is recruiting retiring FA 49s since they
got rid of the double-dip problem, I can talk
them into staying because the work here is so
much more fascinating than it is with contrac-
tors that they’re almost willing to pay me to
come work here.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: When I first met
you, I came to an office like this one and you
were sitting at the end of the table and you had
an array of different spray cans and marked
flags and such. They were all close at hand near
your chair.
E.B. VANDIVER: And bells.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Yes, bells were
there also. I was thinking at the time, “What is
all that paraphernalia for?” Then when you sat
down, I immediately realized that was how you
conducted your murder boards for your ana-
lysts to do their briefings. I figured this array of
things were for you to pick up and wave in
front of them as they were explaining things.
Do you still do murder boards?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes, but all that stuff is
in my bookcase now. People gave me all of
those things. Bob, the one aerosol can Mike is
talking about, was a can of BS repellant.
{Laughter} Which got sprayed once in a while.
And there were a bunch of bells and stuff. We
would have our Analysis Review Boards (ARB)
and on every project, we have a review at the
beginning and one at the end. The first one is,
this is what we’re planning to do and at the
end, this is what we did, and then there may be
one or more in the middle, depending on how
big or how long the project was. This is a qual-
ity assurance measure and the members of the
ARB are all my division chiefs and members of
the command group. It was also an information
thing, so everybody knows what everybody
else is doing. We finish about 120 projects a
year, so we have a lot of ARBs.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How many peo-
ple do you have to do 120 projects a year?
E.B. VANDIVER: About 110 or 120 profes-
sional staff. It’s up to one project or more per
person per year, about where I want it to be.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Tell us about
your museum.
E.B. VANDIVER: It is a museum of CAA
Analysis and Computing and contains many of
those analysis things used in the Army for com-
puting. All of the things are kind of related and
are the kind of things you can put in a museum.
I’ve got papers I’ve collected and many photo-
graphs. I’ve collected all sorts of computing
artifacts. I have the first Apple Computer we
had in the CAA. I’ve got the name plate off of
the last main-frame. Couldn’t keep the last
mainframe, it was humongous, but I kept the
name plate and photographs of it. We also have
mechanical calculators and slide rules, which
was the technology when I came into this busi-
ness.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You were talking
about tools, and you mentioned that some of
the best are from Microsoft Office. Is it because
the tools are so powerful now or is it because
they’re easier to use?
E.B. VANDIVER: Most of what we give
the analysts that we send to the theaters is on a
high-end laptop. We give them a lot of memory
and we give them Microsoft Office, the high
end version. We give them some visual map
display software, Falcon View is one we’ve
used, and then there’s one of the cartographic
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products, also that’s harder to use. We give
them a statistical package. They can do a tre-
mendous range of things with those tools; just
the spreadsheet alone in Microsoft Office is a
powerful tool in itself. If they have to make
briefings, they put it over in a Power Point
slide. And then if they can’t do it, if they need
to do some higher end statistics like analysis of
variance, which they do on some things to see if
we’re looking real trim, they go with the statis-
tical package. A lot of studies look at where
things happen on a geographical basis. So you
display it on a map background. That’s what
I’m giving my analysts to put in their ruck sack
to take to the theater. The rule is if they can do
it in a day or two, they do it themselves; if not,
they send the problem and the data back to us
on the secure network so we can do it here and
we send it back to them. So I’ve got this worked
out, and it is humming like a well-oiled ma-
chine. And the tool you use is what’s appropri-
ate to the problem and how much time you’ve
got. Many times a spreadsheet’s good enough.
Sometimes a spreadsheet inserted on a map
with just plain bars and pies is good enough. If
you need means, medians and what not or box
plots with whiskers, or ANOVA or a multiple
regression, you can do that. If it gets bigger
than that, we’ll build a discrete event simula-
tion like Jack Zeto built on the ambulance prob-
lem. The ambulance thing that Jack has done
was the study that won the Payne Award last
year and is an absolute classic case of real OR.
We got the problem from the theater. We got
the data from the theater. We built a model of it.
We manipulated the model and came back with
a whole range of answers under a whole range
of assumptions and sent it back to the guys that
asked for it. And they were so happy they
could hardly stand it. So, tools, you will use
what you need. If you need a hammer, use a
hammer. If you need a lathe, you go get a lathe.
BOB SHELDON: How many people do
you have doing reach back for Iraq?
E.B. VANDIVER: That’s highly variable.
We have up to about a dozen projects running
at any one time on reach back; but sometimes
it’s less, and sometimes it’s more; and some-
times they’re big and sometimes little. The
workload’s highly variable on reach back.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How many guys
do you have in theater now?
E.B. VANDIVER: One in Afghanistan with
a three-star command, actually there’s two be-
cause I haven’t been able to get the other one
back yet. She made such an impression on LTG
Banno he won’t let her go. She’s writing his end
of tour report now. I’m only supposed to have
one in Afghanistan at the three-star Headquar-
ters. And I have two in Iraq at the three-star
headquarters, but the two headquarters there
are in a dispute over who should get them. So
I suspect they’ll end up moving to the four-star
headquarters. So I have two in Iraq, one in
Afghanistan.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Are they getting
enough “stick time?”
E.B. VANDIVER: We’ve set it up on a six
month basis to “regularize” this thing. They’re
all six-month rotations, with three weeks of
overlap. The Combat Replacement Center
(CRC) time, is separate from the rotation time
so it doesn’t get counted in the 179 days. Ev-
erybody has to go the CRC first for two weeks
and then you have to go back for a few days
when you come back. The time that you use if
you leave here to go there, that gets counted
against your 180 days temporary duty. So we
do that separate to get 180 days. We get a
three-week overlap with your replacement and
I’m running these as six months slots. We got
them laid out for a year. I’m letting everybody
bid on them. Just like the airlines do. The pilots
bid on routes, so I let them bid on these tours.
In the military it’s not if you go, it’s when you
go. So you better give me your preference. The
military don’t want to volunteer for six month
tours because it’s too hard to explain to
Momma, but if I make them go, that’s not a
problem. Anyway, I’ve got them bidding for it
and civilians can go too, but they have to go for
six months also. And I have civilians volunteer-
ing to go. Mainly it is the Presidential Manage-
ment of Fellows Program (PMF) folks, who I
can’t send. We went up to the woman who runs
the Army Interns and PMFs, and asked if it’s
okay if we send one of the PMFs to Iraq. She
went right through the roof. I thought it was a
good idea. But as soon as they convert from the
program, I can send them, and I have.
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MIKE GARRAMBONE: You mentioned
somewhere that you do some work with ARO
or was it ARI?
E.B. VANDIVER: ARI, the Army Research
Institute. We’ve done a few things with them
over the years. They do personnel stuff. Army
Research Office (ARO) funds university re-
search and what not. I used to kind of keep up
with them, but I don’t have much to do with
either of those right now. Now there is the
Army Research Laboratory (ARL) which is up
in the Laboratory Command up there and is the
successor to BRL, so we have a little bit to do
with them now and then, but mostly with AM-
SAA rather than ARL.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How about the
mid-level operational folks at TRAC (TRADOC
Analysis Center) or TRADOC (Training and
Doctrine Command) itself?
E.B. VANDIVER: We work with all parts
of TRAC one way or another: White Sands, Fort
Leavenworth, CASCOM, Fort Lee, and the re-
search office out of Monterey. We work with all
of them.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Are they kind of
“feeders of information” to the level of warfare
work that you look at?
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. We get the doctrine
and the organizations from TRADOC, and we
put it together up at the higher level so
TRADOC input is essential. AMSAA input on
systems is essential. A lot of our learning about
how these units are organized, and how they
employ them occurs by taking part in the
TRAC analyses. That is, by watching the TRAC
analyses while they’re developing these things.
This is because a lot of information is only
available in the form that TRAC has them be-
cause they haven’t become doctrine yet.
They’re not in field manuals and TO&Es yet.
The systems and ideas are out in the future.
They only exist as sort of analytical products
within the TRAC realm.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Are you getting
ready for the QDR?
E.B. VANDIVER: We’re already in the
QDR. We are in the QDR up to our eyeballs.
That’s my number two priority. The CAA pri-
ority number one is to always support the cur-
rent operations. We already talked about that.
Number two this year and this year alone is
QDR and I have a person stationed in the Army
QDR Office. I have made my new technical
director, Dr. Markowitz, our primary point of
contact on it and he knows all about it from
having participated in it from the other side.
We have built a new simulation of the unit
rotation concepts for our modular units. This
will probably be our primary tool in dealing
with most of the issues we expect to come up in
this QDR. And then we have to go to all of the
hundreds of panel meetings and senior leader
updates and IPTs.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You are prepared
to cover a lot of turf here.
E.B. VANDIVER: Yes. But I have been
through this before, this is our third QDR. This
one doesn’t look to be nearly so traumatic as
the last two.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: The Army is
unique in having a senior staff position such as
the DUSA (OR). What are your thoughts on
that position?
E.B. VANDIVER: This office was established
by Dr. Wilbur Payne in the mid 1960s and was
the vehicle by which analysis was made part of
the way business is done in the headquarters.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Although we
talked about Dr. Wilbur Payne, it would be
most helpful for others to better understand the
importance of Dr. Payne’s contributions to OR.
What were some of the specific things he insti-
gated or did over time to be so remembered?
E.B. VANDIVER: Creating a Function
Area 49 for officers and instigating CAA are
two fairly important ones. He was a stickler for
high quality and professional work. He was a
senior leader in the Department of Defense and
the Operations Research community, and was
instrumental in growing military analysts to
perform defense work. A lot of what he did was
encapsulated in the dedication plaque mounted
in our entrance way.
BOB SHELDON: Do you have a parting
shot about where you think military OR is go-
ing?
E.B. VANDIVER: It is very gratifying to
see the extent to which analysis is now institu-
tionalized in the Department of Defense and
especially in getting back to our roots in sup-
porting current operations. I am very proud of
having been a part of this.
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